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BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction of this action for divorce pursuant to UTAH CODE 
ANN. § 78-2a-3(2)(h) (1996). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
I. Whether the trial court erred in holding that UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-1-
4.5(2) (1998) violates article I, § 24, of the Utah Constitution. 
Standard of Review: The trial court's conclusions are reviewed for 
correctness. State v. Mohi, 901 P.2d991 (Utah 1995). 
II. Whether the trial court failed to make sufficient findings on three of the 
elements necessary to establish a common law marriage. 
Standard of Review: The trial court's findings of fact are subject to the clearly 
erroneous standard of review. Howell v. Howell, 806 P.2d 1209 (Utah App. 1991). 
III. Whether the trial court erred in granting the petition to modify the 
original decree of divorce based on a change of circumstances, while at the same time 
finding that the parties had been married pursuant to the common law marriage 
statute. 
Standard of Review: The trial court's ruling on questions of law is reviewed 
under the correction error standard. Wells v. Wells, 871 P.2d 1036 (Utah App. 1994). 
IV. Whether there was a basis for the trial court's award of temporary 
alimony and child support. 
Standard of Review: The trial court's conclusions of law are reviewed for 
correctness and given no special deference on appeal. Howell 806 P.2d 1209. 
V. Whether the trial court's findings of fact supporting its alimony award 
are adequate and whether they are supported by sufficient evidence. 
Standard of Review: The trial court's findings of fact are subject to the clearly 
erroneous standard of review. Howell, 806 P.2d 1209. 
VI. Whether the trial court's findings of fact support its award of attorneys' 
fees. 
Standard of Review: The trial court's findings of fact in awarding attorneys' 
fees are sufficient is a question of law to be reviewed for correctness. Rehn v. Rehn, 
91A P.2d 306 (Utah App. 1999). 
VII. Whether the evidence adduced at the evidentiary hearing on contempt 
supported the trial court's finding that there was clear and convincing evidence that 
Wayne Kelley had the ability to pay the ordered amounts of child support, alimony, 
and marital debt. 
Standard of Review: The trial court's findings of fact are subject to the clearly 
erroneous standard of review. Howell, 806 P.2d 1209. 
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DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION AND STATUTES 
The following constitutional provision and statutes bear on the issues of this 
case: 
UTAH CONST, art. I, § 24: 
All laws of a general nature shall have uniform operation. 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-1-4.5 (1998), which provides: 
(1) A marriage which is not solemnized according to this 
chapter shall be legal and valid if a court or administrative order 
establishes that it arises out of a contract between two consenting parties 
who: 
(a) are capable of giving consent; 
(b) are legally capable of entering a solemnized 
marriage under the provisions of this chapter; 
(c) have cohabited; 
(d) mutually assume marital rights, duties, and 
obligations; and 
(e) who hold themselves out as and have acquired a 
uniform and general reputation as husband and wife. 
(2) The determination or establishment of a marriage under 
this section must occur during the relationship described in Subsection 
(1), or within one year following the termination of that relationship. 
Evidence of a marriage recognizable under this section may be 
manifested in any form, and may be proved under the same general rules 
of evidence as facts in other cases. 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-3-5 (Supp. 1999), which provides in pertinent part: 
(7) (a) The court shall consider at least the following factors in 
determining alimony: 
(i) the financial condition and needs of the recipient spouse; 
(ii) the recipient's earning capacity or ability to produce 
income; 
(iii) the ability of the payor spouse to provide support; 
(iv) the length of the marriage; 
(v) whether the recipient spouse has custody of minor children 
requiring support; 
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(vi) whether the recipient spouse worked in a business owned 
or operated by the payor spouse; and 
(vii) whether the recipient spouse directly contributed to any 
increase in the payor spouse's skill by paying for education 
received by the payor spouse or allowing the payor spouse 
to attend school during the marriage. 
(b) The court may consider the fault of the parties in determining 
alimony. 
(c) As a general rule, the court should look to the standard of living, 
existing at the time of separation, in determining alimony in accordance with 
Subsection (7)(a). However, the court shall consider all relevant facts and 
equitable principles and may, in its discretion, base alimony on the standard of 
living that existed at the time of trial. In marriages of short duration, when no 
children have been conceived or born during the marriage, the court may 
consider the standard of living that existed at the time of the marriage. 
(d) The court may, under appropriate circumstances, attempt to 
equalize the parties' respective standards of living. 
(h) Alimony may not be ordered for a duration longer than the 
number of years that the marriage existed unless, at any time prior to 
termination of alimony, the court finds extenuating circumstances that justify 
the payment of alimony for a longer period of time. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case, Course of Proceedings, and Disposition in the Court Below 
Petitioner/appellee Sonia Kelley and respondent/appellant Wayne Kelley were 
originally divorced in 1994. In 1996, Sonia Kelley filed a motion to set aside the 
decree of divorce (June 14, 1996), a motion for temporary restraining order and 
preliminary injunction (June 14, 1996), a petition to modify the decree of divorce 
(July 10, 1996), and a divorce complaint (July 10, 1996). In 1997, Sonia Kelley filed 
a separate action alleging fraud, which was later consolidated with the divorce 
proceedings. 
This matter came before the trial court on three separate legal claims: 
(1) the claim that fraud had taken place in connection with the 
parties' divorce in 1994; 
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(2) the claim that the parties had entered into a common law 
marriage after their divorce in 1994; and 
(3) a claim that the 1994 decree of divorce should be modified based 
on a change in circumstances. 
In 1997, Wayne Kelley filed a motion for summary judgment with respect to 
the common law marriage theory, because no determination that a marriage had taken 
place occurred within one year of the termination of the parties' relationship as 
required by UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-1-4.5(2) (1998). The trial court ruled that the one-
year requirement set forth in UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-1-4.5(2) (1998) was 
unconstitutional. 
At trial, the trial court found that a common law marriage existed and that the 
petition to modify the original decree of divorce should be granted. The trial court 
dismissed the complaint seeking relief on the basis of fraud. The trial court made 
awards of alimony and child support, divided property, and awarded attorneys' fees. 
In June of 1999, the trial court held an evidentiary hearing to determine 
whether Wayne Kelley was in contempt of the court's orders requiring that he pay 
alimony, child support, and marital debt. The trial court entered a finding of contempt 
and ordered Wayne Kelley to take certain actions or face a fine and imprisonment. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Sonia Kelley and Wayne Kelley were married on May 24, 1980. They have 
two children: Christopher, who was born in 1985, and Erin, who was born in 1990. 
(Findings of Facts Nos. 1 and 2; R. at 1660.) 
During the parties' marriage, Wayne Kelley worked in construction. 
Originally, he founded and owned Altex Construction. In 1990, DSI was created. 
Wayne Kelley owned 55% of DSI's stock. That company was involved in the 
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construction and modification of government facilities throughout the world. 
(Findings of Facts Nos. 3 and 4; R. at 1660.) 
In 1993 and 1994, DSI became involved with the Mathews Companies. Those 
companies were in financial distress at the time. DSI took over the Mathews 
Companies, so that the companies could perform under the various contracts in which 
DSI was involved. (Finding of Fact No. 6, R. at 1660-61.) 
The transactions with the Mathews Companies required that Wayne Kelley 
individually sign and guarantee bonds for the Mathews Companies' performance, 
which would expose his personal assets to considerable risk. The trial court found 
that the parties agreed to enter into a divorce, so that their home could be protected 
from creditors. The trial court found, although this was disputed by Wayne Kelley, 
that Wayne Kelley told Sonia Kelley the parties would not be separated and nothing 
would change from how they had lived in the past. (Finding of Fact No. 9, R. at 
1661.) 
In the spring and summer of 1994, the parties agreed to and entered into a 
stipulation, which resulted in a divorce decree being entered on July 18, 1994. Under 
the decree, Sonia Kelley was awarded custody of the parties' children, the house and 
furnishings, alimony, and child support, and Wayne Kelley was awarded his stock in 
DSI and the parties' investment in property in Kodiak, Alaska. (Finding of Fact 
No. 12, R. at 1661.) Wayne Kelley was to pay all debts up to June of 1994. The 
decree of divorce recited that Wayne Kelley lived and worked in Texas. (R. at 32, 
1 5 . ) 
After the decree of divorce was entered, Wayne Kelley spent the majority of 
his time in Texas. However, when he would come to Utah, he would sometimes stay 
at Sonia Kelley's home. Exhibit 4 indicated that Wayne Kelley spent 58 days at Sonia 
Kelley's home in 1994, 63 days in 1995, and 16 days in 1996. (Vol. Ill, tr. p. 128.) 
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From 1994 until the spring of 1996, Wayne Kelley continued to provide substantial 
financial support to Sonia Kelley. 
During 1994 and 1995, and into 1996, Wayne Kelley lived with another 
woman in Texas. Sonia Kelley testified that she learned of this in 1995, and in fact, 
spoke to the other woman, Theresa Turner, by telephone on several occasions. (R. at 
1722, tr. pp. 93-94.) 
In May of 1996, there was an altercation between the parties, resulting from a 
visitation dispute, which resulted in the police being called and criminal charges being 
filed. Thereafter, Sonia Kelley filed these proceedings. 
At the time of the divorce in 1994, Wayne Kelley was receiving $8,000 per 
month as a draw from DSI and a distribution from the Kodiak property of $10,000 per 
month. He continued to pay substantial amounts to Sonia Kelley to allow her to make 
the mortgage payments and to make payment on the parties' debts, which he had been 
ordered to pay. 
The original pleadings that Sonia Kelley filed in June of 1996, a motion for 
restraining order and preliminary injunction, were aimed at tying up the proceeds of a 
settlement of a lawsuit between DSI and its bonding company. (R. at 50-51.) 
In June of 1999, the trial court held an evidentiary hearing to determine 
whether Wayne Kelley was in contempt based on his failure to pay all of the alimony, 
child support, and marital debt ordered by the court. The trial court entered a finding 
of contempt and imposed punishment on Wayne Kelley. The punishment was stayed 
pending Wayne Kelley's performance of certain actions. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
I. The trial court incorrectly held that UTAH CODE ANN. $30-1-4.5(2) 
violates article I, § 24, of the Utah Constitution. 
The statute at issue does not create a classification other than the classification 
created by any time limitation. In addition, even if a classification is found, the statute 
at issue has a reasonable tendency to further the objectives of the legislature and is 
therefore constitutional. 
II. The trial court failed to make sufficient findings on three of the elements 
required to establish a common law marriage. 
The trial court in this case failed to deal with the requirements of cohabitation, 
in light of the fact that Wayne Kelley lived in Texas with another woman, the fact that 
Wayne Kelley did not consent to be married, and the fact that the parties did not have 
a uniform and general reputation as husband and wife. 
III. The trial court erred in granting the petition to modify the original 
divorce decree based on a change of circumstances, because the trial court found that 
the parties were married pursuant to the common law marriage statute. 
Although the trial court retains continuing jurisdiction to modify a decree of 
divorce, the decree of divorce is no longer in effect if the parties remarry. In this case, 
since the court found that the parties were remarried pursuant to the common law 
marriage statute, it should not have modified the original decree of divorce. 
IV. There was no basis for the trial court's award of temporary alimony and 
child support. 
Since the parties were not married pursuant to the common law marriage 
statute, the trial court could not properly award temporary alimony and child support. 
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V. The trial court's findings of fact supporting its alimony award are not 
adequate and are not supported by sufficient evidence. 
The trial court found that Wayne Kelley's income was $10,000 per month. 
There was no evidence Wayne Kelley was currently receiving $10,000 per month or 
had the ability to receive that income. Moreover, the trial court did not make 
sufficient findings as to the ability of Wayne Kelley to provide $5,000 per month in 
total support. 
VI. The trial court's findings of fact do not support its award of attorneys9 
fees. 
The trial court ordered Wayne Kelley to pay attorneys' fees totaling more than 
$35,000. Utah case law requires that the trial court make findings that Wayne Kelley 
had the ability to pay those fees. In this case, the only finding as to Wayne Kelley's 
ability to pay was the court's finding that he had $10,000 per month in income. 
VII. The evidence adduced at the evidentiary hearing on contempt did not 
support the trial court's finding that there was clear and convincing evidence that 
Wayne Kelley had the current ability to pay the ordered amounts of child support, 
alimony, and marital debt. 
The trial court held Wayne Kelley in contempt for failure to pay alimony, child 
support, and marital debt. At the hearing, Wayne Kelley testified he had $6,000 per 
month as income. The trial court found that he had the ability to produce $10,000 per 
month as income. The finding was not supported by clear and convincing evidence, 
and thus, the trial court should not have found Wayne Kelley in contempt. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING UTAH CODE 
ANN. § 30-1-4.5(2) (1998) UNCONSTITUTIONAL. 
Wayne and Sonia Kelley were divorced in July of 1994. During 1994 and until 
the spring of 1996, they maintained a cordial relationship, which the trial court found 
constituted a common law marriage. Although Wayne Kelley disputes that there was 
a common law marriage and asserts that he was living in Texas, it is undisputed that, 
until the spring of 1996, Wayne Kelley occasionally stayed in Sonia Kelley's home 
and provided substantial funds for the support of Sonia Kelley and his children. 
However, it is also undisputed that, as of the spring of 1996, Wayne Kelley no 
longer stayed at Sonia Kelley's home and had a home in Park City, Utah. (R. at 1722, 
tr. p. 64.) 
In the summer of 1996, Sonia Kelley filed a variety of different pleadings on 
different legal theories. In June of 1996, she filed a motion to set aside the divorce 
decree entered in 1994. In July of 1996, she filed a divorce complaint, alleging in the 
alternative that the decree of divorce entered in July of 1994 was void or that the 
parties were married pursuant to the common law marriage statute. 
In August of 1997, Wayne Kelley filed a motion to dismiss and for partial 
summary judgment on the grounds that Sonia Kelley had not met the requirement set 
forth in UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-1-4.5(2) (1998), that a determination of common law 
marriage take place within one year after termination of the relationship. 
The motion was initially heard by Commissioner Dillon, who denied it. 
Commissioner Dillon held that Judge Allphin had made an adjudication of common 
law marriage by inference in October of 1996. Wayne Kelley objected to the 
commissioner's recommendation. 
On January 28, 1998, Judge Page entered a written ruling on the objection to 
the commissioner's recommendation. (Addendum A, R. at 1172-95.) In his ruling, 
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Judge Page made findings of fact and held that: (1) Commissioner Dillon's 
recommendation should be overruled, as far as it concerned the prior adjudication of 
common law marriage; (2) Wayne Kelley was not estopped to raise the time bar 
because of his resistance to discovery; and (3) UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-1-4.5 (1998) 
was not unconstitutional under the open courts provision of article I, § 11, of the Utah 
Constitution. 
However, the trial court held that subsection 2 of the common law marriage 
statute violated article I, § 24, of the Utah Constitution, which provides: "All laws of 
a general nature shall have uniform operation." The trial court reasoned that article I, 
§ 24, is analogous to the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the 
United States Constitution. To be constitutional under § 24, the trial court said, a law 
must not only be uniform on its face, but also operate uniformly. 
The trial court then considered what level of review was applicable. Because 
the right at issue was in the nature of an economic or social interest, the trial court 
said, the court should employ a "rational basis" analysis. The trial court was then 
required to consider whether: (1) the law applies equally to all persons within a class, 
and (2) the different treatment given the classes must be based on differences that 
have a reasonable tendency to further the objectives of the statute. Warren v. Melville, 
937 P.2d 556, 563 (Utah App. 1997). 
The trial court found that the operation of the one-year time bar set forth in 
subsection 2 created two opposing subclasses from a larger class that was originally 
similarly situated. The trial court said that one class consisted of persons unable to 
obtain a judicial determination of common law marriage within one year, and the 
other class consisted of persons able to obtain a determination within one year. 
The trial court indicated that, in its opinion, a party might be unable to obtain a 
determination of common law marriage within one year after the termination of the 
relationship. As a practical matter, the trial court said, parties might deliberately delay 
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the determination, or the caseload of the court might not allow for a determination 
within the one year. The trial court also indicated its belief that the time limit set forth 
in UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-1-4.5(2) (1998) is extremely unusual. The trial court noted 
that there is little legislative history for the common law marriage statute, but 
speculated "that the legislature may have been attempting to limit the time for action 
for the same reason as with other 'statutes of limitations,' for want of a better word." 
(R. at 1192,11.3-4.) 
The trial court then applied the rational basis test to the two classifications 
created by the statute. The trial court opined that no rational basis could be found for 
the discrimination between persons able to obtain a determination within one year and 
persons who are not. The trial court then found that the one-year provision was 
severable from the remainder of the statute, and that the court should proceed to 
determine whether a common law marriage existed, based on the facts of this case. 
The trial court did not offer any opinion as to whether any time limitation of any kind 
applied to the common law marriage statute. 
In Malan v. Lewis, 693 P.2d 661 (Utah 1984), the Court considered the 
constitutionality of the guest statute. In considering whether the guest statute violated 
article I, § 24, the Court said: 
Whether a statute meets equal protection standards depends in the 
first instance upon the objectives of the statute and whether the 
classifications established provide a reasonable basis for promoting 
those objectives. . . . 
Article I, § 24 protects against two types of discrimination. First, 
a law must apply equally to all persons within a class. Second, the 
statutory classifications and the different treatment given the classes 
must be based on differences that have a reasonable tendency to further 
the objectives of the statute. 
693 P.2d at 670. (Citations omitted.) 
12 
The purpose of the common law marriage statute was to save public funds by 
curbing welfare abuse. David F. Crabtree, Recognition of Common Law Marriages, 
1988 UTAH L. REV. 273. The legislature was apparently concerned that a person 
living in a household might be providing support that would not be considered in 
determining welfare eligibility. Id. 
In Bunch v. Englehorn, 906 P.2d 918 (Utah App. 1995), the Court considered a 
common law marriage claim. The parties had separated in August of 1990, a' 
complaint was filed in May of 1991, but there was no determination of the 
relationship within one year of the parties' separation. The Court of Appeals held that 
the filing of complaint was not adequate and a determination must occur within the 
one-year period to meet the requirements of the statute. 
Appellant in Bunch had argued that the one-year provision was unconstitutional 
under article I, §§ 7 and 11, of the Utah Constitution. However, the Court did not 
reach that issue because the constitutional claims had not been asserted in the trial 
court. Likewise, in Hansen v. Hansen, 958 P.2d 931 (Utah App. 1998), a 
constitutional challenge had been raised, but was not considered by the Court, because 
it disposed of the case on other grounds. The Court noted that a constitutional 
question might be raised if the trial court entered a judgment denying a common law 
marriage within one year of separation and the judgment were reversed on appeal. 
958 P.2d at 937, fn. 2, citing Bunch, 906 P.2d 918. 
Subsection 2 of § 30-1-4.5 functions in part as a statute of limitations. The 
Utah courts have repeatedly noted that the legislature has great latitude to fix 
limitation periods. In Avis v. Board of Review of Industrial Commission, 837 P.2d 584 
(Utah App. 1992), the applicable statute of limitations under the Worker's 
Compensation Act was challenged on the grounds that it violated the open courts 
provision, article I, § 11, Utah Constitution, and uniform operation section, article I, 
§ 24. With respect to equal protection, the petitioner in Avis argued that restricting 
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injured workers from bringing claims for permanent partial disability after the statute 
of limitations has run, unlawfully discriminated against workers who had not been 
rated before the statute of limitations ran. The Court held that the statute of 
limitations at issue did not violate article I, § 24, because all injured workers were 
subject to the same time limitations. In addition, the Court said, limiting the claim 
period for workers bore a reasonable relationship to the achievement of a legitimate 
legislative purpose—protecting employers and the State of Utah Second Injury Fund 
from having to defend stale claims. 837 P.2d at 588. 
The Court in Avis noted that statutes of limitations are presumptively 
constitutional, although courts had recognized exceptions when a statute operated 
harshly in cases where an injured person had no way of knowing that the injury had 
occurred until after the statute had run. That exception does not apply to common law 
marriage claims. 
In Lee v. Gaufin, 867 P.2d 572 (Utah 1993), the Court considered the issue of 
whether statutes of limitations and repose for medical malpractice actions were 
unconstitutional when applied to minors. In Lee, the Court said: 
The fixing of a limitations period is highly judgmental and is 
determined by the Legislature's weighing a number of general policies, 
such as whether particular types of cases require speedy resolution, the 
nature of the evidence typically used in litigating a particular type of 
case, the consequences to putative plaintiffs, defendants, and third 
persons who might be affected by the litigation, and the interest of 
society at large in not leaving disputes unresolved for long periods of 
time. 
Id. at 575. The Court noted that the legislature could fix different limitations periods 
for different causes of action without violating the Utah Constitution. Id. 
In Lee, the Court held that the right to bring a malpractice action was protected 
by article I, § 11, the open courts provision, resulting in a higher level of scrutiny 
under article I, § 24. The Court also said that the legislature's rationale for the 
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medical malpractice statute of limitations and repose as applied to minors was not 
supported by empirical evidence. The Court said: "The legislative means for solving 
the insurance problem by cutting off the malpractice claims of minors simply does not 
further the legislative objective." Id. at 588. Thus, the Court said, under the 
heightened level of scrutiny, the medical malpractice statute of limitations and the 
statute of repose, as applied to minors, were unconstitutional. 
The reasoning of Lee is not applicable in this case. First, the rights of minors 
are not implicated. The Lee court indicated that it gave special protection to the rights 
of children. Second, the right to a finding of common law marriage is not a right 
protected by the open courts provision. The open courts provision generally protects 
rights to recover for personal injury or common law remedies that existed at the time 
of Utah statehood. Ross v. Schackel, 920 P.2d 1159 (Utah 1996). 
Thus, the classification in this case must only meet the rational basis test. The 
question is whether the statute has a reasonable tendency to further the objectives of 
the legislature. 
The rationale for requiring that a determination of common law marriage take 
place quickly is obvious. Whether a person is or has been married is fundamental to 
all of his social and economic decisions. The legislature obviously wanted to prevent 
long drawn-out proceedings, adjudication of stale claims, and the harm that would 
result to families from not knowing whether a marriage existed or not. Thus, the 
classification the trial court found to exist clearly serves the legislative purpose and 
tends to further the objectives of the statute—a timely adjudication of whether a 
common law marriage exists. 
Moreover, the trial court mistakenly found that the statute creates two 
classifications. Every statute of limitations, under the trial court's analysis, creates 
two classifications of persons, those who file within the time limit required and those 
who do not. In fact, there is really only one classification of persons existing here; 
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those who claim a common law marriage existed. All of these persons are treated the 
same under the statute. 
In Ryan v. Gold Cross Services, Inc., 903 P.2d 423 (Utah 1995), the Court 
noted that its function is to examine the reasonableness of a classification in light of 
legislative objectives. In that case, the Court held that the legislature had created a 
class of tort defendants who were treated differently from other tort defendants. The 
Court said it would sustain the legislative classification if it could reasonably conceive 
of facts that would justify the classification and if the legislature chose a reasonable 
means to achieve its objectives. The Court found that the statute at issue met these 
requirements and held the statute constitutional. 
In this case, the trial court incorrectly found that the statute had created a 
classification. However, even if a classification existed, a legitimate legislative 
purpose existed for the classification—prevention of stale claims and avoiding drawn-
out proceedings to determine whether common law marriages exist. The one-year 
time requirement is a reasonable means to achieve those objectives. Because the one-
year requirement is reasonable and therefore justifiable in light of the legislative 
objectives, the trial court erred when it found the statute unconstitutional. 
II. THE TRIAL COURT FAILED TO MAKE SUFFICIENT 
FINDINGS ON THREE OF THE ELEMENTS REQUIRED 
TO ESTABLISH A COMMON LAW MARRIAGE. 
In Whyte v. Blair, 885 P.2d 791 (Utah 1994), the Court held that, in order to 
establish a common law marriage, a claimant must prove each of six different 
elements: 
(1) a contract between two consenting parties; 
(2) who are capable of giving consent; 
(3) who are legally capable of entering a solemnized marriage under 
the provisions of this chapter; 
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(4) who have cohabited; 
(5) who have mutually assumed marital rights, duties, and 
obligations; and 
(6) who hold themselves out and have acquired a uniform and 
general reputation as husband and wife. 
The Court said in Whyte: 
No single factor is determinative. Evidence of each element is essential. 
Consenting parties must show cohabitation, assumption of marital rights 
and duties, a general reputation as husband and wife, capacity to marry, 
and capacity to give consent. Often these five elements . . . can be 
proved or disproved with relative ease. However, whether the parties 
consented to be married is often disputed. 
Id at 794. 
In this case, the trial court made extensive findings, based on Sonia Kelley's 
testimony and the testimony of the parties' neighbors in Bountiful, Utah, that the 
parties' relationship did not change after their divorce in July of 1994. The trial court 
said that the parties continued to live as they had prior to the divorce. (Finding of Fact 
No. 17, R. at 1664.) The trial court also relied on an anniversary card Wayne Kelley 
had sent to Sonia Kelley in 1995, and the fact that they traveled to Mexico together. 
(Findings of Fact Nos. 20 and 21, R. at 1664-65.) 
However, the trial court ignored certain undisputed facts. The original decree 
of divorce entered in 1994 recited that Wayne Kelley was living and working in 
Texas. In 1994, Wayne Kelley had an apartment in Texas, where he was living with 
another woman, Theresa Turner. Wayne Kelley spent the substantial majority of his 
time in Texas, returning to Sonia Kelley's home to visit. In 1994, Wayne Kelley spent 
only 58 days in Utah, in 1995, 64 days, and in 1996, only 16 days at the marital home. 
According to Wayne Kelley's testimony, the amount of time he spent in Utah 
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decreased substantially after the divorce, and occasionally, when he came to Utah, he 
stayed in hotels. (Vol. Ill, tr. pp. 128-29.) 
In order to establish that the parties had a uniform and general reputation as 
husband and wife, Sonia Kelley presented the testimony of a number of her neighbors 
in Bountiful, Utah, who did not know that the parties were divorced. However, one of 
those neighbors, Jan Michael, testified that she learned of Wayne Kelley's relationship 
with another woman when Sonia told her about it in September of 1995. (R. at 1723, 
tr. p. 19.) Sonia Kelley admitted that she had spoken to Ms. Turner on the telephone 
in 1995, and had even called Ms. Turner's mother to inquire whether Mr. Kelley and 
Ms. Turner had been married. (R. at 1722, tr. pp. 94-5.) 
There was clearly evidence, although disputed by Wayne Kelley, on which the 
trial court could base findings that the parties continued to act as if they were husband 
and wife during the limited time that Wayne Kelley was in Bountiful, Utah However, 
the trial court made no findings to deal with the fact that Wayne Kelley was actually 
living with another woman in the state of Texas. 
Utah appellate courts have not considered the definition of cohabitation in the 
context of the common law marriage statute. However, the Court of Appeals has 
considered the definition of cohabitation in the context of alimony termination. In that 
context, the Court of Appeals has said that cohabitation is comprised of two elements: 
common residency and sexual contact evidencing a conjugal association. Haddow v. 
Haddow, 707 P.2d 669 (Utah 1985). In this case, although Wayne Kelley disputed the 
testimony, Sonia Kelley testified that the two had continuing sexual contact. Even if 
all of Ms. Kelley's testimony is accepted, however, the facts that Wayne Kelley spent 
the vast majority of his time living in his apartment in Texas, and that he was residing 
there with another woman, negates any implication that the parties were residing 
together. 
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In Sigg v. Sigg, 905 P.2d 908 (Utah App. 1995), the Court said: "Common 
residency means 'the sharing of a common abode that both parties consider their 
principal domicile for more than a temporary or brief period of time." Id. at 917. 
(Citations omitted.) During the time period at issue, Wayne Kelley resided only 
temporarily in Utah. 
In addition, the Court in Hansen, 958 P.2d 931, made it clear that a finding of 
common law marriage requires that the parties have a uniform and general reputation 
as husband and wife. In this case, while Sonia Kelley was able to present evidence 
that her neighbors did not know of the divorce, she presented no evidence that Wayne 
Kelley's friends or business associates believed the parties to be married. In fact, 
there was substantial, unrefiited evidence to the contrary. Theresa Turner, the woman 
with whom Wayne Kelley had lived in Texas, testified that she went out to dinner 
with Wayne Kelley's business associates, clients, and friends in Texas, and that they 
were aware that he was divorced from Sonia Kelley. Rosalee Kelley, Wayne Kelley's 
mother, testified that Sonia Kelley discussed with her the fact that the parties were 
divorced. Rosalee Kelley was also aware that Wayne Kelley was living with another 
woman and discussed that fact with Sonia Kelley. Sam Baker, Wayne Kelley's 
longtime lawyer and friend, testified that he had gone out to dinner with Wayne 
Kelley and Theresa Turner and was aware of the divorce. (Vol. Ill, tr. pp. 93-4.) 
Based on the foregoing, the trial court failed to make sufficient findings on 
three essential elements required to be proved to establish a common law marriage: 
(1) The trial court did not deal with the issue of whether the parties 
were cohabiting when Wayne Kelley had another home in the state of Texas, 
where he lived with another woman the majority of the time. 
(2) The trial court did not deal with Wayne Kelley's lack of consent 
to be married. Sonia Kelley obviously knew that Wayne Kelley was living 
with another woman, and in fact, made inquiries as to whether he intended to 
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marry the other woman, negating the notion that she thought Wayne Kelley had 
consented to be married to her. 
(3) The only evidence that the parties had a uniform and general 
reputation as husband and wife came from the testimony of their neighbors in 
Bountiful, Utah. Obviously, the people that Wayne Kelley associated with in 
his home in the state of Texas did not believe that he was married to Sonia 
Kelley. 
Because the trial court failed to make sufficient findings on these three 
elements, its conclusion that a common law marriage existed was in error. 
III. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE 
PETITION TO MODIFY THE ORIGINAL DIVORCE 
DECREE BASED ON A CHANGE OF CIRCUMSTANCES, 
WHILE AT THE SAME TIME FINDING THAT THE 
PARTIES HAD BEEN MARRIED PURSUANT TO THE 
COMMON LAW MARRIAGE STATUTE. 
In 1996, Sonia Kelley filed a petition to modify the divorce decree entered in 
July of 1994, claiming that there had been a change of circumstances since the entry 
of the original decree. The petition to modify essentially alleged that a change in 
circumstances had occurred, because Wayne Kelley was no longer paying an amount 
in excess of the amount ordered by the decree of divorce to Sonia Kelley for her 
support. (Petition to Modify Decree of Divorce, R. at 122, f^ 8.) In addition, the 
petition to modify contained allegations that Wayne Kelley misled Sonia Kelley as to 
the financial situation at the time of the divorce. (R. at 123, f^ 12.) 
In Bayles v. Bayles, 367 Utah Adv. Rep. 33 (Ct. App. 1999), the Court of 
Appeals held that a petition to modify was not the proper way to pursue a fraud claim. 
In Bayles, the Court said that fraud was not a change of circumstances that would 
justify a modification of the decree, and a person seeking relief on that basis must file 
an independent action for fraud. 
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In this case, Sonia Kelley did file an independent action for fraud, which was 
later consolidated with the divorce complaint. Thus, the allegations of fraud could not 
provide the basis for the trial court's granting of the petition to modify. Moreover, the 
trial court specifically found that no fraud had taken place. (Finding of Fact No. 26, 
R. at 1665.) 
The trial court in this case found a change of circumstances based on the 
termination of Wayne Kelley's financial support of Sonia Kelley. (Conclusions of 
Law Nos. 4 and 5, R. at 1671.) Based on that change of circumstances and based on 
the common law marriage, the trial court modified the terms of the original decree of 
divorce. 
In this case, in effect, the trial court at the same time held that the parties were 
married and not married. Under UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-3-5 (Supp. 1999), the court 
has continuing jurisdiction to make changes in a divorce decree. However, the 
divorce decree is presumably no longer in force if the parties are married. 
In Whyte, 885 P.2d 791, one of the issues was whether, under common law 
marriage statute, Whyte was married to Mitchell, the holder of an automobile 
insurance policy, at the time of his accident. If a marriage existed, Whyte would be 
covered under the policy as a member of Mitchell's family. The trial court had ruled 
that the marriage was not valid until a court or administrative order had been entered, 
and that Whyte and Mitchell could not therefore have been married at the time of the 
accident. On appeal, the Court said: "The issue is whether Utah Code Ann. § 30-1-
4.5 permits an order to establish that a lawful marriage existed prior to the entry of the 
order." 885 P.2d at 793. The Supreme Court held that the trial court could enter an 
order recognizing a lawful marriage that began before the order was entered and 
remanded to the trial court to determine whether a valid marriage existed at the time 
of the accident. 
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In this case, it is obvious that the trial court found that a common law marriage 
existed from the time of the parties' divorce in 1994. In fact, the trial court awarded 
alimony for a period of sixteen years. UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-3-5(7)(h) (Supp. 1999) 
provides that alimony may not be ordered for a duration longer than the number of 
years that the marriage existed, unless, at any time prior to the termination of alimony, 
the court finds extenuating circumstances that justify the payment of alimony for a 
longer period of time. In this case, since the trial court made no findings of 
extenuating circumstances, it must have combined the length of the solemnized and 
common law marriages in order to award alimony for sixteen years. 
Based on the trial court's apparent finding that the parties were married from 
1994 to 1996, the decree of divorce that ended the marriage in 1994 should not have 
been modified. Once the parties were married again, the decree was no longer 
effective. Thus, the trial court erred in modifying that decree of divorce. 
IV. THERE WAS NO BASIS FOR THE TRIAL COURT'S 
AWARD OF TEMPORARY ALIMONY AND CHILD 
SUPPORT. 
In 1996, the trial court in this case entered an order requiring that Wayne 
Kelley pay Sonia Kelley temporary alimony and child support totaling $6,000 per 
month. The trial court did not explain the basis for that award, since no specific 
finding of a common law marriage had been made, and the 1994 decree awarded 
different amounts of alimony and child support. 
After the trial in this matter, the trial court retroactively modified the award of 
temporary alimony and child support. Apparently, the basis for the temporary award, 
as modified by the trial court, was the trial court's finding of common law marriage. 
As indicated in this brief, the trial court erred in finding that common law 
marriage had been established, in light of the one-year determination requirement and 
in light of the lack of evidence on some of the elements of common law marriage. 
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Given that no common law marriage existed, the award of temporary support had no 
basis and should be reversed. 
V, THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDINGS OF FACT 
SUPPORTING ITS ALIMONY AWARD ARE NOT 
ADEQUATE AND ARE NOT SUPPORTED BY 
SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE. 
With respect to Wayne Kelley's income, the trial court made the following 
findings of fact: 
34. The Court finds that respondent has manipulated his 
corporations by taking funds through loans and not as income with these 
withdrawals as he sees fit. This is not a traditional method of 
compensation, and respondent has manipulated his income as he has 
seen fit. 
35. The Court finds that respondent has used the assets of 
these businesses to meet his own living expenses and to purchase 
property for his own interest. The Mercedes 600SL is an example. 
36. The Court finds that historically respondent has had an 
income in excess of $10,000 a month with funds received from the 
Kodiak property and a salary of $8,000 a month from DSL Currently, 
respondent receives a salary $6,000 a month from Omega Oil. In 
addition, respondent has received funds through loans not reflected as 
income from his various businesses. Consistent with past 
manipulations, respondent currently has manipulated his income to limit 
his income presented in this proceeding. 
37. The Court finds that the income amounts reflected above 
coincide with the amount of funds utilized by the parties to meet 
ongoing family expenses, both prior to the entry of the decree of divorce 
in July 1994, and since that time. 
38. The Court finds that respondent currently has the ability to 
produce income at the amount of $10,000 per month and finds that his 
income is in this amount. 
(R. at 1668-69.) 
The evidence relating to Wayne Kelley's income was as follows: Wayne 
Kelley testified that he was currently receiving a salary of $6,000 per month from 
Omega Oil. (Vol. Ill, tr. p. 155.) He testified that in the past, he had received a draw 
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from DSI of $8,000 per month, and in addition, had received $10,000 per month in 
income from the Kodiak property located in Alaska. (Vol. Ill, tr. pp. 154-5.) He 
testified that the monthly income from the Kodiak property ended in June of 1996. 
That testimony was not refuted. 
Sonia Kelley testified that Wayne Kelley had provided approximately $7,000 
to $7,500 per month in funds to the family from 1994 to 1996. (R. a1 50.) That 
testimony was likewise not refuted. 
Testimony was also received from both Wayne Kelley and Fred Frink that 
Wayne Kelley had had access to an expensive Mercedes vehicle during the parties' 
separation. However, despite the fact that extensive testimony was presented on this 
issue, no evidence at all was presented to indicate that the Mercedes was purchased 
with Wayne Kelley's personal funds. 
Likewise, extensive evidence was presented that Wayne Kelley was residing in 
a home located in Park City, Utah, with a value of more than 1.5 million dollars. 
Again, although extensive testimony was presented on this issue, no evidence was 
presented that the home was purchased with Wayne Kelley's personal funds. 
There simply was no evidence to support the trial court's finding that Wayne 
Kelley had the ability at the time of trial to produce income of $10,000 per month. As 
the trial court correctly noted, during parts of the marriage, Wayne Kelley did well 
financially; at other times, he did poorly. As the trial court correctly noted, there had 
even been a bankruptcy. There was unrefuted testimony that DSI's financial 
condition was poor and that it had substantial debt. 
The mere fact that Wayne Kelley had in the past had higher income than he had 
at the time of trial does not support the trial court's findings. 
Even if Wayne Kelley were to make $10,000 per month, he would be required 
to pay income taxes on that amount. If his income taxes amounted to 30%, it is 
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difficult to understand how he could pay his own expenses, debts, attorney's fees as 
ordered by the court, and still pay alimony and child support of $5,000 per month. 
The Utah Court of Appeals has repeatedly said that in determining whether to 
award alimony and in setting the amount, a trial court must consider the needs of the 
recipient spouse, the earning capacity of the recipient spouse, the ability of the obligor 
spouse to provide support, and the length of the marriage. Rehn, 91A P.2d 306. In this 
case, the trial court found that Sonia Kelley's reasonable monthly expenses, not 
including her income tax liability, were $5,000 per month. The trial court indicated 
that Wayne Kelley had testified as to expenses of $10,500 per month, but did not 
make a finding as to what Wayne Kelley's expenses were. The trial court did not 
explain how it calculated Sonia Kelley's income tax liability, how it took into account 
her income from her employment, or how Wayne Kelley would have the ability to pay 
the amount of alimony, child support, debt, and attorney's fees ordered. 
In Rehn, the Court said the trial court must make detailed findings on all 
material issues which should "include enough subsidiary facts to disclose the steps by 
which the ultimate conclusion on each factual issue was reached." 974 P.2d at 310. 
(Citation omitted.) 
Because the evidence does not support the trial court's findings of fact, and 
because the findings of fact are inadequate, the alimony award should be reversed. 
VI. THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDINGS OF FACT DO NOT 
SUPPORT ITS AWARD OF ATTORNEY'S FEES. 
In this case, there was extensive testimony about attorneys' fees owed by each 
of the parties. In addition to ordering Wayne Kelley to pay $5,000 per month in 
combined alimony and child support, and creating arrearages of approximately 
$37,000 for child support and $56,000 for alimony, the trial court ordered Wayne 
Kelley to pay attorneys' fees to Sonia Kelley's attorneys, Louise Knauer of $10,951, 
and to B.L. Dart and Mark Larsen of $25,000. 
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UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-3-3 (1998) provides for awards of attorney's fees in 
divorce cases. There are three findings required to be made by a trial court in 
awarding attorney's fees: (1) the receiving spouse's financial need; (2) the payor 
spouse's ability to pay; and (3) the reasonableness of the requested fees. Childs v. 
Child*, 967 P.2d 942 (Utah App. 1998). 
In this case, the trial court found that the fees requested by Louise Knauer were 
reasonable, that the fees requested by B.L. Dart and Mark Larsen should be reduced 
from $46,574.95 to $25,000, and that as to Louise Knauer's fees, Sonia Kelley had no 
funds with which to pay them. (Finding of Fact No. 42, R. at 1669.) The trial court 
also found that Wayne Kelley had "a substantial ability to earn an income." (Finding 
of Fact No. 41, R. at 1669.) 
As indicated previously, the trial court found that Wayne Kelley had an income 
of $10,000 per month from which he should pay combined alimony and child support 
of $5,000 per month, plus all the marital debts and his own expenses. The trial court 
did not explain how Wayne Kelley could also obtain the funds necessary to pay the 
attorney's fees awarded. Thus, the trial court's ruling with respect to attorney's fees is 
not supported by sufficient factual findings and should be reversed. 
VII. THE EVIDENCE ADDUCED AT THE EVIDENTIARY 
HEARING ON CONTEMPT DID NOT SUPPORT THE 
TRIAL COURT'S FINDING THAT THERE WAS CLEAR 
AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE THAT WAYNE KELLEY 
HAD THE CURRENT ABILITY TO PAY THE ORDERED 
AMOUNT OF CHILD SUPPORT, ALIMONY, AND 
MARITAL DEBT. 
The decree of divorce in this matter was entered on July 22, 1999. However, 
before the decree was actually entered, Sonia Kelley filed a motion with the court 
seeking to have Wayne Kelley held in contempt of court for failure to pay the ordered 
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amounts of alimony, child support, and marital debt. The evidentiary hearing on the 
contempt issue took place on June 25, 1999. 
At the hearing, Wayne Kelley testified that he was employed by Omega Oil, 
receiving income of $6,000 per month. (Transcript of Evidentiary Hearing on 
June 25, 1999, hereinafter referred to as "Contempt Tr.," at p. 4.) He testified that he 
had no other source of income and no assets. (Contempt Tr. pp. 4-5.) 
Wayne Kelley also testified that he had substantial debt. (Contempt Tr. at 
pp. 5-6.) Mr. Kelley testified that the trial court's order required him to maintain life 
insurance and health insurance for the benefit of his children and ex-wife, and that he 
was required to pay premiums for those policies. 
On cross-examination, Wayne Kelley testified that he had received $15,000 as 
a personal loan, for which he had pledged his shares in DSI as collateral. (Contempt 
Tr. p. 18.) Because he could not repay the loan, the shares were taken. Wayne Kelley 
further indicated that he no longer had a mortgage obligation on a house in Park City, 
Utah. Those payments had been made by DSI. (Contempt Tr. p. 22.) No testimony 
or other evidence was presented that Wayne Kelley had any other sources of income, 
or any other opportunities to produce income. 
Based on that evidence, the trial court found that Wayne Kelley had the ability 
to produce income of $10,000 a month at a minimum, that Wayne Kelley had 
voluntarily chosen to stay with Omega Oil, and that Wayne Kelley had the ability to 
generate sufficient income to meet the obligations that he was ordered to pay. 
(Findings of Fact re: Contempt Nos. 4, 5, and 6, R. at 1690.) The trial court found that 
there was clear and convincing evidence that Wayne Kelley was in contempt by 
reason of his failure to pay the debts and obligations and failure to pay the ordered 
amounts of child support and alimony. 
No evidence was adduced at the hearing on contempt that Wayne Kelley had 
income beyond the $6,000 a month from Omega Oil as he testified. The evidence did 
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indicate that he had consistently paid $2,000 per month as child support from that 
income. 
In making its finding that Wayne Kelley had the ability to pay alimony, child 
support, and debt, the trial court apparently relied on its previous findings in the 
divorce proceedings that Wayne Kelley had the ability to produce income of $10,000 
per month. However, there was no evidence that Wayne Kelley had that ability at the 
time of the hearing on contempt. The only evidence presented that Wayne Kelley 
might have additional resources was the fact that he invited his children to go with 
him to Africa. However, the unrefuted testimony was that another person would have 
paid the children's expenses on such a trip. 
In Coleman v. Coleman, 664 P.2d 1155 (Utah 1983), the issue was whether the 
defendant was in contempt for failure to pay alimony. The Court reaffirmed its prior 
holdings that, in order to sustain a finding of contempt, there must be clear and 
convincing proof that the defendant (1) knew what was required; (2) had the ability to 
comply; and (3) willfully and knowingly failed and refused to do so. 
In this case, there was no proof of any kind that Wayne Kelley had the current 
ability to make the payments the trial court had ordered. Essentially, the trial court 
relied on the fact that Wayne Kelley had had higher income in the past. This does not 
amount to clear and convincing evidence of a current ability to comply with the trial 
court's order. 
Because there was no evidence that Wayne Kelley had the current ability to 
pay the amounts ordered, the trial court's findings of contempt should be reversed. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court should have granted Wayne Kelley's motion for summary 
judgment, because Sonia Kelley did not obtain a determination of common law 
marriage within the one-year time frame required by the statute. The statute does not 
28 
violate the uniform operation clause of the Utah Constitution, because it does not 
create an impermissible classification, and because it is a reasonable means to further 
legislative objectives. 
Moreover, the trial court failed to deal with several elements required to be 
established to sustain a common law marriage determination. 
Because there was no common law marriage, the trial court erred in awarding 
temporary alimony and child support during the pendency of the proceedings. In 
addition, the trial court's findings with respect to its alimony award are inadequate. 
The trial court also failed to make sufficient findings to support its award of 
attorneys' fees. 
With respect to the issues consolidated with this appeal, there was no evidence 
in the record from which the trial court could find by clear and convincing evidence 
that Wayne Kelley had the current ability to pay the alimony and child support 
awarded, and the trial court's finding of contempt was improper. 
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RULING ON PLAINTD7FTS AND 
DEFENDANT'S OBJECTIONS TO 
COMMISSIONER'S 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
Case No. 944700827 DA 
This matter came before the Court for oral arguments on both parties1 objections to the 
recommendations made October 10, 1997 by Commissioner David S. Dillon of this Court. 
Plaintiff was present and represented by Mark A. Larsen. Defendant was also present, 
represented by Clifford C. Ross. 
After the presentation by both sides of oral argument, the Court ruled that it would not 
follow Commissioner Dillon's September 25, 1997 recommendation that there had been a 
determination of common-law marriage between the parties within the required one year time 
limit. The Court specifically found that Judge Michael G. Allphin's brief statements at a 
temporary support hearing held October 11, 1996 did not amount to the "determination" or 
"establishment" required by U.C.A. § 30-1-4.5. The Court took the matter under advisement on 
the constitutional and estoppel issues to prepare a written opinion. The Court has reviewed the 
applicable law, as well as all pleadings submitted by the parties, and hereby finds and rules as 
follows: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
The Court finds the following relevant facts in this case: 
1. That the parties were legally married May 24, 1980, at Forth Worth, Texas; 
2. That plaintiff, citing irreconcilable differences, filed a verified complaint for divorce 
in this Court June 7, 1994, case no. 944700827; 
3. That pursuant to defendant's default, this Court entered a decree of divorce July 
18, 1994; 
4. That plaintiff moved this Court, on June 14, 1996, to set aside the Decree of 
Divorce, alleging that defendant had fraudulently induced her into seeking such divorce for 
reasons relating to defendant's business liabilities, that the parties had thereafter continued to live 
as man and wife until April of 1996 when they separated in fact, and that the support amounts 
(child and alimony) reached in that divorce were less than she would have received in a fair 
divorce; 
5. That plaintiff thereafter filed a separate common-law divorce action in this Court 
(case no. 964701047), alleging the existence of a common-law marriage under U.C.A. § 30-1-4.5 
since the time of the parties1 divorce in case no. 944700827; and seeking support and alimony in 
an amount substantially increased over the amount awarded in the parties1 prior divorce decree; 
6. That plaintiff also moved this Courtvin case no. 944700827, to modify the Decree 
of Divorce, as an alternative method of relief if her motion to set aside the divorce should fail; 
7. That plaintiff attempted to conduct discovery on issues involving defendant's 
financial status, which were resisted by defendant, ultimately resulting in motions to compel and 
for a bench warrant and sanctions by plaintiff, which were heard at a hearing in front of Judge 
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Michael G. Allphin of this Court on October 11, 1996, along with other issues relating to support 
and visitation. Plaintiff alleges that she was prepared, at that hearing, to discuss issues relating to 
the existence of a common-law marriage, but did not fiilly go forward on those issues because she 
received the support she was requesting. At the close of oral arguments, Judge Allphin took the 
matter under advisement to prepare a written ruling; 
8. That in his written ruling, Judge Allphin awarded plaintiff $6,000 per month in 
support after finding appropriate income and factors to support such an award, but made no 
written findings concerning the existence of a common-law marriage. An order on the ruling was 
signed January 2, 1997; 
9. That defendant continued to resist discovery of his and his corporation's (DSI) 
financial status, filing various motions to quash and protective orders, while plaintiff moved the 
Court for a judgment on back support owing. The Court heard oral argument January 22, 1997, 
and made oral findings, upon which the Court signed an order dated March 31, 1997. The order 
awarded plaintiff judgment on her claim, but stayed execution, and ordered: the parties to sell 
several of their assets; defendant to comply with discovery on all documents except that relating 
to confidential documents concerning a lawsuit settlement DSI had received; and a special master 
appointed. The order also denied defendant's motion to reduce support, and also disposed of 
several other minor matters; 
10. That Plaintiff moved the Court April 4, 1997 to withdraw her motion to set aside 
the Decree of Divorce; 
11. That plaintiff thereafter, on April 25, 1997, filed a verified motion for an order to 
show cause, on the issues of contempt for allegedly continuing to fail to pay the support ordered, 
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and asking for various other forms of relief, including defendant's executing a deed to the parties' 
home so that it might be sold before being foreclosed upon, which execution of deed was set forth 
in the parties' 1994 divorce decree, and which defendant had not yet complied with; 
12. That at the order to show cause hearing, held May 6, 1997 in this Court, defendant 
executed the deed to the parties' home. The Court also awarded judgment against defendant for 
back support, ordered his Park City home to be sold, and ordered sanctions of $100.00 per day 
for every day after May 16, 1997 for which there is non-compliance with discovery orders; 
13. That defendant thereafter objected to plaintiffs proposed order on the Court's 
findings at the May 6, 1997 hearing and moved to consolidate cases nos. 944700872 and 
964701047; 
14. That June 12, 1997 the Court entered an order on its May 6, 1997 ruling ; 
15. That the two cases were consolidated June 12, 1997; 
16. That a hearing on defendant's motion for a protective order regarding discovery 
was heard in front of Commissioner Dillon August 1, 1997, in which Commissioner Dillon 
partially granted defendant's motion; 
17. That defendant thereafter moved the Court for dismissal or partial summary 
judgment, alleging in essence no determination of the existence of a common-law marriage within 
the one-year period specified by U.C.A. § 30-1-4.5, and therefore no cause of action; 
18. That plaintiff moved the Court for a further judgment on the defendant's contempt 
for failure to pay support, alleging an amount owing of $52,409 25, 
19. That Judge Alfred Van Wagenen of this Court entered a protective order August 
22, 1997 allowing defendant to disclose (to plaintiff and counsel only) the amount of the DSI 
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lawsuit settlement, but not requiring any disclosure as to any other fact or term of such 
settlement; 
20. That at a hearing in front of Commissioner Dillon held September 25, 1997 the 
parties argued issues relating to defendant's motion to dismiss or for partial summary judgment. 
Commissioner Dillon ruled that Judge Allphin's statements at the October 11, 1996 hearing 
constituted an adjudication that there had been a common-law marriage, and that defendant's 
failure to comply with discovery estopped him from raising the defense of the time bar, but did 
not rule on issues raised by plaintiff concerning the constitutionality of U.C.A. § 30-1-4.5; 
21. That both plaintiff and defendant filed objections to Commissioner Dillon's 
recommendations, plaintiff objecting to Commissioner Dillon's failure to rule on the 
constitutionality of U.C.A. § 30-1-4.5, and defendant on the findings of estoppel and of a prior 
adjudication as to a common-law marriage; 
22. That the matter came before this Court November 18, 1997 for a hearing on 
defendant's objections. The Court, as stated supra, set aside Commissioner Dillon's 
recommendations that there had been a prior adjudication as to a common-law marriage and took 
under advisement the estoppel and constitutional issues. The Court left support and alimony as 
previously ordered; 
23. That none of plaintiffs written discovery requests to defendant dealt with issues 
directly relating to the existence of a common-law marriage. The discovery requests in the case 
file generally relate to defendant's financial status, DSI's financial status, the lawsuit settlement 
DSI received, and the corporate relationship between DSI and defendant. While defendant surely 
failed to comply with both the rules and the Court's orders relating to written discovery on these 
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issues, his compliance or non-compliance with such discovery can not be said to have prejudiced 
plaintiffs attempts to obtain a determination on the common-law marriage issue. Plaintiff alleges 
that had defendant made himself available for deposition, notices of which were set repeatedly, 
and thereafter repeatedly ignored by defendant, plaintiff would have deposed him on the common-
law marriage issues, rather than solely on the financial issues. The Court has no evidence of this 
intention before it - significantly, the only sworn affidavits concerning defendant's refusal to be 
deposed are from Louise T. Knauer, plaintiffs former counsel, (at Exhibits "D" and "F" to 
plaintiffs Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss and For Partial Summary 
Judgment) which make no mention of issues relating to common-law marriage, but speak only to 
financial disclosure matters; 
24. That plaintiff never, within the one year period after April of 1996, the last date 
she alleges the parties were living together as man and wife, formally moved the Court for an 
adjudication as to the parties' common-law marriage status. The common-law marriage issue is 
central to plaintiffs complaint filed in case no. 964701047, but the issue has never been directly 
addressed in any proceeding, including that presently before the Court. Specifically, as pointed 
out by defendant, she has never moved the Court for summary judgment on the issue. 
From the above-stated facts the Court rules as follows: 
ESTOPPEL 
Defendant moves the Court for summary judgment and sets forth facts which he asserts 
would entitle him to such. Plaintiff has not directly disputed such facts, but alleges that her failure 
to comply with the one-year time limit imposed by U.C. A. § 30-1-4.5 is due solely to defendant's 
refusal to comply with discovery, and that he should thus be estopped from asserting such as a bar 
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to plaintiffs action. She alleges that she has repeatedly attempted to conduct discovery of 
defendant which would have allowed her to prove the common-law marriage issue. Plaintiff fails 
to present evidence that would allow the Court to refute that which is before the Court, in the 
form of the pleadings of the case file. 
In the matter before the Court there appear to be few material factual disputes - perhaps 
the facts relating to defendant's conduct with respect to conducting discovery are in dispute, 
although such have not been specifically plead. The parties do seem to be in opposition on the 
question of what issues defendant was to be deposed, with plaintiff alleging, in her statement of 
supplemental facts, that deposition was to be conducted on common-law marriage issues, as well 
as others. Plaintiff cites no record reference as required by Rule 56, U.R.Civ.P., and there is no 
evidence whatsoever in the case record to support such an assertion. Rather, as set forth above, 
all pleadings related to that issue speak only to the disclosure of financial information. 
Defendant also sets forth that plaintiff never moved the Court for summary judgment on 
the common-law marriage issue, which would have allowed her to put her own facts before the 
Court and required defendant to refute those facts with his own. Plaintiff argues that she was 
prepared to address the issue at the October 11, 1996 hearing in front of Judge Allphin, but never 
did so because of Judge Allphin's determination that support should be awarded. Both parties 
have submitted transcripts, not certified, of the Court's discussion relating to that issue - they are 
the same, and not objected to by either party, thus the Court would adopt such as a correct 
transcript of the actual discussion for the purpose of this ruling. Ms. Knauer, plaintiffs former 
counsel, asked the Court: 
Is the Court inclined to want to hear about whether there's a common-law marriage? 
7 
The Court replied: 
Given the facts in this case, Mr. Crist, I'm inclined to treat this as, at least on a 
temporary basis, as if he has an obligation of support and then just determine how 
much that obligation is as opposed to hearing a lot on the common law marriage. . . 
this is a case where they lived together for a substantial period of time after the 1994 
divorce, held themselves out as husband and wife, and I realize he may want to 
contest the fact that it's common-law divorce, but at least on a temporary basis. . . I'm 
going to treat it as if he had an obligation to support. 
Plaintiff has failed to prove that she was prejudiced as to a resolution of the common-law 
marriage issue solely through defendant's resistance to discovery. That is not to say that 
defendant's actions did not significantly delay the matter going to trial, as it likely has done just 
that, the effect of which the Court addresses in the next section, infra. Nevertheless, she has 
never, to this point, formally moved the Court for an adjudication of the common-law marriage 
issue, thus it was never properly before the Court for a "determination" before the one-year time 
limit expired. Plaintiffs assertions that she wanted to raise the issue at the October 11, 1996 
hearing do not explain why it was not raised otherwise, after it was not fully addressed at that 
hearing. As such, the defense of estoppel is unavailable to her to defeat defendant's motion for 
summary judgment. 
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF UCA § 30-1-4.5 
As an alternative defense to defendant's motion to dismiss and for summary judgment, 
plaintiff argues that the statute in question, U.C.A. § 30-1-4.5, in unconstitutional, both on its 
face, and as applied. Specifically, plaintiff claims that it violates the "Open Courts" provision of 
the Utah Constitution (Article I, section 11) because, on its face, "it constitutes an arbitrary, 
unjustified deprivation of the right to adjudication." (Plaintiffs memo in opposition.) Plaintiff also 
claims that, as applied in this case, the statute is unconstitutional in that it forecloses her rights 
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when the failure to receive the required adjudication is the fault of the defendant. In defense of 
his position, defendant cites Bunch v. Englehorn. 906 P.2d 918 (Utah Ct. App 1995), where that 
Court held that the language requiring a "determination" within one year meant just that, rather 
than meaning "filing" the action; and also argued that plaintiff had failed to notify the Utah 
Attorney General of her intention to challenge the constitutionality of the statute, as he alleges is 
required by U.C.A. §78-33-11. 
Initially, the Court disposes of defendant's contention that plaintiffs unconstitutionality 
defense must fail because the attorney general had not been notified. The text of U.C.A. § 78-33-
11, "Parties," is: 
When declaratory relief is sought all persons shall be made parties who have or claim 
any interest which would be affected by the declaration, and no declaration shall 
prejudice the rights of persons not parties to the proceeding. In any proceeding which 
involves the validity of a municipal or county ordinance or franchise such municipality 
or county shall be made a party, and shall be entitled to be heard, and if a statute or 
state franchise or permit is alleged to be invalid the attorney general shall be served 
with a copy of the proceeding and be entitled to be heard 
(emphasis added) The Court finds the above statute to have no effect on this proceeding. The 
chapter this section is under is entitled "Declaratory Judgments," and it is clear from its context 
that the section applies to those cases where a declaratory judgment on the validity of a law is 
sought as a cause of action. Here, plaintiff is asserting the invalidity of the statute as a defense to 
summary judgment in a domestic matter, and for no other purpose, thus the Court sees no reason 
to implicate the notice statute as relevant to the matter. If the basis of her common-law divorce 
complaint was substantially premised on the invalidity of the statute, however, the Court might 
have found differently. Nevertheless, even if the statute could be construed to require plaintiff to 
notify the attorney general, such was accomplished. The attorney general has intervened in this 
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case as of June 6, 1997, and has received copies of all pleadings since that time, including those 
referencing this issue. Mr. Richard Hummel, the assistant attorney general assigned to this case, 
could have requested to address this issue at oral argument, had he so desired. There is, 
therefore, no violation of U.C.A. § 78-33-11, and this argument is rejected. 
U.C.A. § 30-1-4.5, "Validity of marriage not solemnized," reads as follows: 
(1) A marriage which is not solemnized according to this chapter shall be legal and 
valid if a court or administrative order establishes that it arises out of a contract 
between two consenting parties who: 
(a) are capable of giving consent; 
(b) are legally capable of entering a solemnized marriage under the provisions 
of this chapter; 
© have cohabited; 
(d) mutually assume marital rights, duties, and obligations; and 
(e) who hold themselves out as and have acquired a uniform and general reputation 
as husband and wife. 
(2) The determination or establishment of a marriage under this section must occur 
during the relationship described in Subsection (1), or within one year following the 
termination of that relationship. Evidence of a marriage recognizable under this 
section may be manifested in any form, and may be proved under the same general 
rules of evidence as facts in other cases. 
(emphasis added) As set forth above, the Utah Court of Appeals, in Bunch, held that the statute's 
plain meaning literally required a "determination" or "adjudication" within one year of the 
termination of the alleged common-law relationship, rather than the simple filing of an action for 
such a determination within one year. That Court, affirming the trial court's decision, held there 
to be no ambiguity within the time limit provision, and thus no allowance for any interpretation 
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contrary to the plain terms. Plaintiff has not argued the meaning of the statute to be other than 
such plain meaning, but the Court sets forth this standard to frame the constitutional question. 
In Bunch, at appeal, the appellant also attempted to raise constitutional challenges to the 
statute, which the Court dismissed because they had not been properly raised at the trial level. 
Citing State v. Bobo. 803 P.2d 1268, 1273 (Utah Ct. App. 1990), the Court held that "the proper 
forum in which to commence thoughtful and probing analysis of state constitutional interpretation 
is before the trial court, not, as typically happens . . . for the first time on appeal." Bunch, 906 
P.2d at 921. Appellant had attempted to argue at appeal that the statute violated both sections 7 
and 11 of Article I of the Utah Constitution (the sections entitled "Due Process of Law," and 
"Courts Open - Redress of Injuries," respectively). The Court of Appeals held that appellant's 
trial court mention of "concerns" about the statute's constitutionality amounted to "nominally 
alluding" to the issue, a level of discussion held to be insufficient to allow review on appeal by 
State v. Johnson. 771 P.2d 326, 328 (Utah Ct. App. 1989),1 and thus rejected the argument. 
This Court concludes that the question of the constitutionality of U.C.A. § 30-1-4.5 is 
properly before it and proceeds to rule on that issue: 
Plaintiffs, although generally alleging U.C.A. § 30-1-4.5 to be violative of the Utah 
Constitution, do not reference any particular constitutional provision other than the "Open 
Courts" provision, Article I, section 11. That section reads: 
All courts shall be open, and every person, for an injury done to him in his person, 
property or reputation, shall have remedy by due course of law, which shall be 
administered without denial or unnecessary delay; and no person shall be barred from 
prosecuting or defending before any tribunal in this State, by himself or counsel, any 
civil cause to which he is a party. 
1
 Reversed on other grounds, 805 P.2d 761 (Utah 1991). 
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Before proceeding to analyze whether the statute violates the open courts provision, a 
preliminary question must be answered by the Court: Is the nature of the right eliminated of a 
type that its destruction may be addressed with reference to the open courts provision? The Utah 
Supreme Court, in Berry v. Beech Aircraft Corp.T 717 P.2d 670 (Utah 1985), referencing a prior 
decision, Masich v. United States Smelting. Refining & Mining Co.. 113 Utah 101, 191 P.2d 612 
(1948), stated, with respect to Article I, section 11 rights: 
In a sense, therefore, the common law at the time of statehood provides a measure of 
the kinds of legal remedies that the framers must have had in mind (at least in scope 
if not in form) for the protection of life, property, and reputation. 
BerryT 717 P.2d at 676 n.3. In Ross v. SchackeL 920 P.2d 1159 (Utah 1996), the Utah Supreme 
Court addressed the constitutionality of provisions of the Governmental Immunity Act under the 
open courts clause. (Open courts analysis of immunity is closely akin to that relating to statutes of 
repose, like that performed in Berry, in that a remedy is foreclosed through the operation of a 
statute.) After citing Berry, the Court stated: "In deciding whether this subsection abrogated such 
a remedy, we must examine the common law at the time of statehood to determine whether a 
prisoner could recover damages from a prison physician for negligent medical care." Ross. 920 
P.2d at 1162. In Debry v. Noble. 889 P.2d 428 (Utah 1995), another immunity case, the Court 
stated: "We have previously indicated that the scope of the protections afforded by article I, 
section 11 had to be viewed in light of the immunities that were recognized when the Utah 
Constitution was adopted. See Madsen IT 658 P.2d at 629." Debry. 889 P.2d at 435. In Cruz v. 
Wright. 765 P.2d 869 (Utah 1988) the Court looked at the dismissal of a loss of consortium claim 
under the open courts clause. The Court, in affirming the trial court's dismissal, disagreed with 
the appellant on both her argument that such a cause of action existed at the time the Utah 
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Constitution was adopted and on her argument that the passage of the 1898 Married Women's 
Act unconstitutionally abolished any possibility of the cause of action. This Court must therefore 
determine if a cause of action such as that now existing under U.C.A. § 30-1-4.5 existed at the 
time the Utah Constitution was adopted. The Court finds that it did not. 
The Utah Supreme Court in Whyte v. Blair. 885 P.2d 791 (Utah 1994) stated: 
Prior to 1987, Utah never recognized common law marriages; indeed, such marriages 
were expressly prohibited. Utah Code Ann. § 30-1-2(3) (1984) (repealed by § 
30-1-4.5 (1987)): In re Vetas' Estate. 110 Utah 187, 190, 170P.2d 183, 184(1946); 
see also Layton v. Layton. 777 P.2d 504, 505 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). 
Whyte. 885 P.2d at 793. As all open court analysis must be premised on the basis that such a 
right existed at the time of the adoption of the Utah Constitution, and since no such right existed 
at that time, the Court must find that there can be no open courts violation by its restriction. 
Uniform Operation of Laws / Equal Protection Analysis 
The parties did not raise the issue of a possible equal protection violation at oral argument 
or in their briefs. Nevertheless, the Court finds the matter to be of sufficient import to raise and 
address it sua sponte. While review of the one-year time limit is foreclosed under the open courts 
clause, because of the "unavailability of the remedy at the time of adoption of the constitution" 
reason stated above, no such prohibition exists as to review under Article I, § 24. That section 
succinctly states: "All laws of a general nature shall have uniform operation." The clause is 
analogous to the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. 
Although their language is dissimilar, these provisions embody the same general 
principle: persons similarly situated should be treated similarly, and persons in 
different circumstances should not be treated as if their circumstances were the same. 
Malan v. Lewis, 693 P.2d 661 (Utah 1984). The history and operation of the two clauses are not 
necessarily parallel, however. The Malan Court went on to say: 
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Although Article I, § 24 of the Utah Constitution incorporates the same 
general fundamental principles as are incorporated in the Equal Protection Clause, 
our construction and application of Article I, § 24 are not controlled by the federal 
courts' construction and application of the Equal Protection Clause. Case law 
developed under the Fourteenth Amendment may be persuasive in applying Article 
I, § 24, e.g., Baker v. Matheson. Utah, 607 P.2d 233, 243 n.4 (1979), but that law is 
not binding so long as we do not reach a result that violates the Equal Protection 
Clause. Bierkamp v. Rogers. Iowa, 293 N.W.2d 577, 579 (1980); Carson v. Maurer. 
120 N.H. 925, 424 A.2d 825, 831 (1980); Nehring v. Russell. Wyo., 582 P.2d 67, 76 
(1978). The different language of Article I, § 24, the different constitutional contexts 
of the two provisions, and different jurisprudential considerations may lead to a 
different result in applying equal protection principles under Article I, § 24 than might 
be reached under federal law. 
IJL, at 670. See also, Lee v. Gaufin. 867 P.2d 572, 577 (Utah 1993). The Lee Court explained 
the analysis to be used in reviewing the constitutionality of a statute under Article I, section 24. 
For a law to be constitutional under Article I, section 24, it is not enough that 
it be uniform on its face. What is critical is that the operation of the law be uniform. 
A law does not operate uniformly if "persons similarly situated" are not "treated 
similarly" or if "persons in different circumstances" are "treated as if their 
circumstances were the same." Malan v Lewis, 693 P.2d 661, 669 (Utah 1984). In 
State Tax Commission v Department of Finance. 576 P.2d 1297, 1298 (Utah 1978), 
the Court stated: 
Equal protection protects against discrimination within a class. The 
legislature has considerable discretion in the designation of classifications but 
the court must determine whether such classifications operate equally on all 
persons similarly situated. 
Thus, whether a classification operates uniformly on all persons similarly situated 
within constitutional parameters is an issue that must ultimately be decided by the 
judiciary. 
Lee, 867 P.2d at 577. (emphasis supplied) On the same subject the Malan Court stated: 
Article I, § 24 protects against two types of discrimination. First, a law must 
apply equally to all persons within a class. Second, the statutory classifications and 
the different treatment given the classes must be based on differences that have a 
reasonable tendency to further the objectives of the statute. If the relationship of the 
classification to the statutory objectives is unreasonable or fanciful, the discrimination 
is unreasonable. 
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When persons are similarly situated, it is unconstitutional to single out one 
person or group of persons from among a larger class on the basis of a tenuous 
justification that has little or no merit. 
Equal protection of the law, both state and federal, requires more of a state 
law than nondiscriminatory application within the class it establishes. The 
classification must rest upon some difference which bears a reasonable and just 
relation to the act in respect to which the classification is proposed, and can never be 
made arbitrarily and without any such basis . . . Arbitrary selection can never be 
justified by calling it classification. The Courts must reach and determine the question 
whether the classifications drawn in a statute are reasonable in light of its purpose. 
Malan, at 670-672. (citations omitted) The Malan Court implied the level of review that is 
applicable to specific varieties of rights under Article I, section 24 analysis, and the Lgg Court 
adopted and illuminated that standard. There, the Court said: 
After Allen was decided, Malan v. Lewis. 693 P.2d 661 (Utah 1984), held that 
a standard of scrutiny stricter than the rational-basis standard governed when a 
discrimination implicated a right protected by the open courts provision of Article I, 
section 11 of the Utah Constitution. In Malan, the Court stated that in applying 
Article I, section 24, it was necessary to distinguish between discriminations against 
economic or social interests and discriminations that implicated rights protected by 
Article I, section 11. In the latter instance, a higher standard of judicial scrutiny was 
required because two constitutional values must be given due recognition: (1) the 
policy underlying the uniform operation of the laws provision, which militates against 
arbitrary laws that favor the interests of the politically powerful over the interests of 
the politically vulnerable; and (2) the policy that a person has a constitutional right to 
a remedy for an injury to one's person. 
Lss, 867 P.2d at 58 L2 Therefore, before proceeding to analyze the operation of Article I, section 
24 with respect to the common-law marriage time bar, the Court must first determine the level of 
review applicable. As set forth above, the Court does not find the right created by U.C.A. § 30-1-
4.5 of the type included as one of those protected by Article I, section 11. While some courts 
2
 Footnote 14 to Lee (p.581) states: "Malan did not adopt the federal equal protection analytical framework 
that applies one of three levels of scrutiny, depending on the nature of the interest discriminated against. See Malan. 693 
P.2d at 674 n. 17; accord Mountain Fuel Supply Co. v. Salt Lake Citv Corp.. 752 P.2d 884, 888-90 (Utah 1988)." 
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have indeed held the right to a judicial determination of relationships between married people 
analogous to a "fundamental right,"3 it is hard to see, given the history, that Utah courts would 
adopt this view with respect to the right to a common-law marriage determination. It is this 
Court's opinion that such a right is more in the nature of an "economic or social interest" that 
merits "rational-basis" analysis.4 Other courts have so held -" . . . the Court is unable to find the 
protection of a marital estate or community property rights impinges upon a "fundamental right." 
White v. State Farm. 907 F.Supp. 1012 (E.D. Tex. 199S)(see9 infra, n.14, for a further discussion 
of this case); "actually, even now the existence of a constitutional right to commit adultery is 
somewhat problematical and has not been recognized in any decisions to which our attention has 
been drawn." Chlystekv Kane. 412 F.Supp. 20 (W.D. Pa. 1976). 
With the above points of reference in mind, the Court must determine, under a rational-
basis review, if the one-year time limitation of U.C.A. § 30-1-4.5 is constitutional under Article I, 
section 24. The Lee Court set forth the actual review process to be used under this standard: 
Under the rational-basis, or least restrictive standard, a statutory classification 
is constitutional unless it has no rational relationship to a legislatively stated purpose 
or, if not stated, to any reasonably conceivable legislative purpose. A presumption of 
constitutionality is extended to statutes . . . and that presumption is sufficient to 
sustain the constitutionality of a classification created by the statute unless the 
classification creates an invidious discrimination, or bears no rational relationship to 
a legitimate state purpose. Moreover, the presumption requires a court to presume 
that the classification was intended to further the legislative purpose. 
IsL, at 580. (citations omitted) 
3
 See, e.g., Boddie v. Connecticut. 401 U.S. 371; 91 S. Ct. 780; 28 L. Ed. 2d 113 (1971). 
4
 Such "rational-basis" analysis under Article I, section 24 is not necessarily as liberally in favor of the 
legislature's discretion as that applied by Federal Courts under the fourteenth amendment, however. See, e.g., Mountain 
Fuel Supply v. Salt Lake Citv. 752 P.2d 884, 889-890 (Utah 1988) (citing cases where statutes impinging on non-
"fundamentaT interests were struck down). 
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While the above-quoted language appears to create two avenues of review, one under 
"invidious discrimination," and one under "legitimate state purpose," the two are actually one, as 
"invidious discrimination" means that discrimination which is arbitrary, irrational and not 
reasonably related to a legitimate purpose See, e.g., McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U S 184, 191, 
85 S Ct. 283, 13 L Ed 2d 222 (1964)5 All laws create classifications - and by classification, 
some may feel that there is discrimination6 However, only that discrimination found to be 
"invidious" is subject to judicial review with respect to "non-fiindamental" rights To begin the 
process of analysis, the Court must determine the classifications resulting from the operation of 
the one-year time bar The Court finds the operation of the law to create two disparately-treated 
opposing sub-classes from a larger class that was originally similarly-situated When a party is 
unable to obtain a judicial determination of common-law marriage within one year, for one or 
more of many reasons, that party, and others so affected, become a class Those that are able to 
have such a determination within the year constitute another class Below, the Court reviews the 
reasonableness of the discriminatory treatment accorded the classes 
5
 U S v Comm'r of Correction. 316 F Supp 556,564 (S D N Y 1970), BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 826 
(6th ed 1990) states "Term 'invidious' in context of claim that difference in treatment amounts to 'invidious 
discrimination' in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment, means arbitrary, irrational and not reasonably related to a 
state purpose " (citing Eaton v State. 363 A 2d 440,441 (Del 1976)) 
6 MA11 laws, either explicitly by their terms or implicitly by exclusion from the scope of the law, create legal 
classifications Justice Wolfe stated m State v Mason. 94 Utah 501,507,78 P 2d 920,923 (1938) 
Of course, every legislative act is in one sense discriminatory The Legislature cannot in one 
act legislate as to all persons or all subject matters It is inclusive as to some class or group 
and as to some human relationships, transactions, or functions and exclusive as to the See 
also, remainder For that reason, to be unconstitutional the discrimination must be 
unreasonable or arbitrary A classification is never unreasonable or arbitrary m its inclusion 
or exclusion features so long as there is some basis for the differentiation between classes or 
subject matters included as compared to those excluded from its operation, provided the 
differentiation bears a reasonable relation to the purposes to be accomplished by the act" 
Lee, 867 P 2d at 577, n 6 
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The statute, as set forth, requires that the necessary determination be obtained within one 
year of the termination of the relationship. There are numerous reasons, some the fault of the 
party seeking the determination, many not, that such a determination might not be able to be 
obtained within that one year. As noted by the Court of Appeals in Bunch, if an appellate court 
were to overturn a trial court determination of common-law marriage and remand the matter, the 
issue "might" not be decided within the required period.7 Given the time it takes in our system for 
a matter to be resolved, and then to go through the appellate process and back to the trial court, it 
is this Court's opinion that a final decision within the one-year period would actually be highly 
unlikely. If the facts were reversed, and an appellate court reversed and remanded a trial decision 
of no common law marriage, the same result would likely also occur, and there would again be no 
determination within the required time. 
Other possible scenarios precluding a determination within one year are: 
1. The party opposing the determination vigorously resists any determination before 
the year passes. Any reasonably competent attorney can use various tactics to successfully delay 
the forward process of a proceeding. Discovery can be held up, the parties can be intentionally or 
unintentionally unavailable, spurious objections and motions can be made, as well as numerous 
other tactics used by which the matter can be delayed until the one-year period passes. Defendant 
argues that plaintiff could have moved the Court for summary judgment on the issue despite his 
actions, yet a motion for summary judgment can also be relatively easily delayed - Rule 56(f) 
continuances are routinely granted as a matter of course. If the action is commenced close to the 




the time for submitting and deciding the matter after pleadings have been completed might easily 
foreclose a timely determination. In the Court's opinion, furthermore, motions for summary 
judgment are particularly ill-suited to domestic matters, especially one such as this. This Court 
cannot recall such a motion, before the present, having ever been filed in a domestic matter. Even 
if such a motion were used, the factual disputes particularly inherent to domestic matters would 
likely preclude a summary determination that there was a common-law marriage, and there is no 
right to an evidentiary hearing at summary judgment. If no such determination were therein 
obtained, the matter could not proceed until it was heard for trial. Furthermore, the Court is 
unaware of any other type of legal question that must be submitted, once filed, to a determination 
within a certain time, even if the matter is not yet ready for an actual trial. 
2. The caseload and procedures of the Court reviewing the matter might not allow 
for determination within a year, especially if the matter were commenced later in the one-year 
period. Cases, especially in this regard, complicated divorce cases, can often take longer than a 
year to get to trial. Even with the most agreeable counsel, such cases are often the subject of 
several preliminary matters that must be set for hearing and heard before other related issues can 
go forward. Contentious counsel can extend such periods much longer. 
In this district, as in several others within the state, a domestic relations commissioner 
hears all preliminary matters prior to the actual trial. The commissioner may only make 
"recommendations" to the trial court - their decisions are not final.8. It is doubtful that such a 
"recommendation" would meet the "determination or establishment" standard required by U.C.A. 
§ 30-1-4.5, and would therefore require ratification by the trial court before reaching such a level. 
8
 U.C. J. A., Rule 6-401 (6)(A). 
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U.C.J.A., Rule 6-401(4), states: "the commissioner's recommendation is the order of the court 
until modified by the court." The modification procedure involves objecting to the 
recommendation within ten days of the decision, after which a hearing may be set by the district 
court on the issue. In actual practice, however, objections are often left unresolved until the time 
of trial, which may occur long after the year period has passed. Even more insidious would be a 
situation where the commissioner's recommendation is that there was a common-law marriage, 
the opposing party objects, and the matter is not heard until trial, at which point the trial court, 
after the year is over, reverses the recommendation. Any possibility of appellate review, reversal 
and remand would be foreclosed. Such scenarios do not even address the situations where courts, 
through their own negligence or bureaucratic inefficiency, are unable to resolve the matter in the 
required time. Files are lost, hearing schedules are miscommunicated, more pressing matters 
require priority attention, etc. . .9 
It appears the type of time limit within U.C.A. § 30-1-4.5 represents an aberration on the 
entire body of U.S. law. The Court has been unable, after substantial research, to find even a 
single comparable statute in operation in the entire country, under any area of law that 
significantly affects the rights of individuals. Furthermore, the Court has not found a single 
appellate decision reviewing such a time statute, attesting to their rarity, if not absolute non-
9
 The above list is, of course, not all-inclusive. Many other factors could influence whether a determination 
within the statutory period might be available. The time limitation in U.C.A. § 30-1-4.5 could conceivably be termed a 
statute of repose, rather than a statute of limitations. In that estoppel and other forms of tolling of the statutory time may 
not be available under statutes of repose, any number of personal and institutional crises, emergencies, etc, that would 
generally be (fairly) allowed to continue a matter would be useless. See, e.g., Selvage v. J.J. Johnson & Assoc's. 910 
P.2d 1252,1258 (Utah Ct. App. 1996); Anixter v. Home-Stake Prod. Co. 939 P.2d 1420,1436 (10th Cir. 1991). 
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existence.10 Nevertheless, simply being first to do something does not make one incorrect - the 
initial problems and later great successes of the drafters of the Magna Carta, and even our own 
Federal Constitution attest to that fact. Above, the Court has addressed the problems with the 
operation of the statute, now it must determine if such operational problems are reasonable, non-
arbitrary, and rationally related to any reasonably conceivable state purpose. 
As with most Utah statutes not enacted within the very last few years, there is little 
legislative history available to guide the Court as to the purposes for which the statute was 
proposed. The Utah Supreme Court, in WhyteT 885 P.2d 791, stated: 
The legislative history of section 30-1-4.5 clearly indicates that it is a 
codification of common law marriage principles. Office of Legislative Research & 
General Counsel, Summary S.B. 156 Recognition of Common Law Marriages (1987). 
The summary of Senate Bill 156 expressly refers to the bill as a common law marriage 
provision. It states, "Once a common law marriage has been found to exist by a court 
or administrative order, it is treated as any other marriage for all purposes." 
Although the legislative summary does not expressly declare the reasons the 
Legislature adopted Utah Code Ann. § 30-1-4.5 and changed what had been basic 
Utah marriage law, the Legislature's purpose is clear: A marriage under the statute is 
valid from the time it is entered. If such a marriage were valid only from the time of 
the entry of a formal order, then that marriage would not differ from traditional 
marriages and the adoption of a common law form of marriage would serve no 
purpose. The only advantage of a common law marriage is to give formal recognition 
to marriages informally entered into in the past. 
10
 As an example of the breadth of research attempted on the issue, the Court used the search terms: 
(detennin! or adjudicat! or establish! or decide! or decision!) /10 (must or shall or require!) 12 (occur or happen or "take 
place") /10 (within or "no more") /3 year!, in LEXIS. In the codes/allcodes database, which contains all federal and state 
statutes and regulations, 6 possible results were obtained, one of which was U.C.A. § 30-1-4.5. No other result was 
even remotely applicable to the discussion. In the mega/mega database, which contains most federal and state case law 
for the last 100 or so years, 26 results were seen. Four of the cases cited U.C.A § 30-1-4.5. All of the other cases 
related to regulatory matters, taxation, and directives for government entities. None of the cases cited statutes having set 
times for determinations affecting individual rights. 
In its research the Court was able to find one case citing a somewhat similar statute, albeit with a traditional 
"commencing" deadline. White v State Farm. 907 F.Supp. 1012 (E.D. Tex. 1995) struck down under equal protection 
analysis a statute reading: "A proceeding in which a marriage is to be proved under this section must be commenced not 
later than one year after the date on which the relationship ended or not later than one year after September 1,1989, 
whichever is later." The plaintiff had argued the statute was unconstitutional under the open courts and due process 
clauses, as well, but the court did not reach a decision on those issues. 
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Mu, at 793-794 While somewhat helpful, such a statement gives no insight into the reasoning 
behind the one year period that creates the classifications and problems discussed above The 
Court would venture a guess that the legislature may have been attempting to limit the time for 
action for the same reason as with other "statutes of limitations," for want of a better word 
Generally, the purpose of any statute limiting a time for remedy is to compel the exercise of a 
right within a reasonable time, to avoid stale claims, loss of evidence, and faded memories See, 
e.g., Horton v. Goldminer's Daughter 785 P 2d 1087, 1091 (Utah 1989) Berrv held that the 
purpose of a statute of repose (which this may be) must be to eliminate a clear social or economic 
evil and it must not be an arbitrary or unreasonable means for achieving the objective Berry. 717 
P 2d at 680 In the area of domestic law, such a statute would probably also serve the additional 
purpose of allowing people to have closure in an important area of their personal lives 
Against these reasonably conceivable purposes the Court must gauge the disparate 
treatment afforded the different classifications under the operation of the statute u If the two are 
rationally, not arbitrarily, related, then under the deference accorded such legislation, the Court 
must hold the statute constitutional 
It is the Courtfs opinion that no rational basis can be found for such discrimination, in that 
the statute's operation is, as set forth in the scenarios above, practically de facto arbitrary The 
11
 Because of the statement of the legislation's effect, "Once a common law marriage has been found to exist 
by a court or administrative order, it is treated as any other marriage for all purposes," it is the Court's opinion that a 
class closely related to those able to obtain a determination within one year is comprised of those already in a solemnized 
marriage Once a party is able to obtain the necessary judicial determination within one year, the party is placed m 
exactly the same class as those in a solemnized marriage, with all of the same rights and benefits The most relevant of 
those rights perhaps, in this instance, bemg no time limitation whatsoever for the resolution of any and all domestic 
matters (This lack of tune limitation for those in the "solemnized marriage" class tends to raise a question why the 
legislature might feel those m the (somewhat similarly situated) "common-law mamage" class have some 
correspondingly greater need to have "closure in an important area of their personal lives ") 
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Mdiuic intended the possibility of the determination afforded 
„j \.t* statute to be b ~* h clear, given, the above-cited commonplace possibilities, 
*
u
 - ic prospect f^ r !|UT
 : ; ;nat come 
|iPl'hrf i (ie Court on the issue. For the fortuitous group that is able to get the matter adjudicated 
within the year, they should feel most fortunate Justice, however should i In- ilnlnl i i Il 
hasis t I kj.i iii i/licii1, i " . Ii ii | ^position lies in the face of one of the most basic principles this 
country and state were founded upon, the administrator . f r^tice with an even ;. . f e^ 
most importantly, justice should noi ?: * malicious or 
Maying actions of others. A person's access to remedies under the law, such as the adjudication 
afforded by this statute, should be self-determining, not capa. ^ . . .w r;: / 
> The discriminatory operator* oi LIUS ?r*^ -v •*• -an 
only be described as invidious. The Court therefore finds the one-year provision of LI C A fc JO 
1-4.5(2) unconstitutional. 
The severability clause note to the section reads: 
Laws 1987, ch. 246, § 5 provided that if any provision of Chapter 246, oi the 
application of any provision to any person or circumstance, is held invalid, the 
remainder of the chapter is to be given effect without the invalid provision or 
application. 
Therefore, as the Court finds the time barring provision m\ alid, the Lourt iiu) | "i i fun" I 
deteiiiiijit1, m tin1 ii.ii i .il i IIIII I ilii" riunn whether a common-law marriage existed according 
to the factors set forth in the valid remaining portions of the statute. 
CONCH JSION 
Based on the foregoing reasons, the Court rules that defendant's Motion for Summary 
Judgment is HEREBY DENIED. 
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Dated January 2 ^ . 1998 
BY THE COURT: 
RODNEY S^AGE ^ 
DISTRICT JUDGE 
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v. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
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T illers r,ime on regularly tor tnnl on the ?i"J nnd 
4th days of December, 1998, petitioner appearing in person and by her attorneys, B. L. Dart 
and - . arsen rt.".>pi null'ill iippi'.iiiiii| HI | H I M HI IIHI !iy lir, .illinin • v. I " ' l | ! M.iyi i>< l< 
and the Court having heard testimony from witnesses and havi'-"-' r e c e j v e o u s 
documentary evidence and the matter having been argued .=---.; -.;;• ;.ea ana i t 
being fully advised, hereby makes the following: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. The Court finds that the parties were married to each other on the 24th day 
of May 1980, in Ft. Worth, Texas. 
2. During this marriage the parties had two children born as issue of this 
marriage, to wit: Christopher W. Kelley, currently 14 years of age, born February 5, 1985 
and Erin Renee Kelley, currently eight years of age, born September 9, 1990. 
3. Over the course of the marriage respondent worked primarily in construction. 
He founded and was the owner of Altex Construction in Alaska involved in work on the 
DEW line and other government contracts. 
4. In 1990 DSI was created. Respondent owns 55% of DSI's stock. DSI was 
involved in the construction of government facilities and modification of government 
facilities to insulate those facilities from terrorism. This work was worldwide. 
5. During the marriage between the parties respondent's work was such that it 
required him to be away from home for extended periods which included on occasion 
renting apartments in which to stay. This occurred on one occasion in Colorado and on 
one occasion in Texas. Because of the nature of his work, he was home intermittently, 
was gone for long periods of time on a regular basis and was very seldom at home on a 
long-term, continuous basis. 
6. In 1993 and 1994 DSI became involved with the Mathews Companies, 
corporations which were in difficulty at that time. DSI sought to take over Mathews to 
shore it up so that Mathews would be able to perform under various contracts on which DSI 
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had contingent liability 
as of Spring of 1994. 
7. The parties were not unfamiiiai < min II .mjssitudet ""' H" < M 
Inisinr*-:,', II hi- ' " '^oerienced a bankruptcy while they wore in I exas Ihey had QUH J 
deed in lieu cr foreclosure on the residence in which they had lived in the ..-
n1! I"he transactions between DSI and Mathews Companies required that 
II i' ,| IOI it IN 'in ii it ii yi'iuui. my rs Con npai lies b} si Mathews 
Companies' perfoirnaiire which would expose his assets to considerable risk 
In discussion,-. lielwtKMi II 11 i in in In •: IPSII n in In ill II Il ill ni'tilinm-i il ill II n 
pi oblciu and the need to preserve and protect the family home. He proposed tl mat the 
parties should enter into a divorce so that tl ie home cot ild be placed in potilini'1 i n HUH 
. .
 i e i l t ja l 0 f crecjitors because of the concerns he had related to the 
DSI/Mathews Companies transaction. He represented to the petitioner that the pai ties 
i/iiHi1 in .I i)(niiij lii IM s ^ n m t M anJ lli.il nolhinq would change from how they had lived 
before. 
1ii I n in II in | uns 'ipiiiiij inn ' i i ii i i in in i 1 HI li'i'ii i iiiiiiin pairtips agreed to and did enter 
into a divorce action, resulting in r;e being entered on the 18th day of July *or>* h 
the District Coml oil I). 
agreement between the p- . to divorce was an agreement for a non-traditional divorce 
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which created a legal fiction only, designed to protect the residence of the parties from the 
threat of creditors. 
11. In connection with the divorce action petitioner contacted an attorney. 
Respondent waived his rights. Both of the parties attended a parenting class and the Court 
accepts the testimony of Dr. Marty Hood and finds it is credible that during the intermission 
halfway through the parenting class, respondent approached her and told her that the 
divorce the parties were going through was only a business thing and that the children 
would never know there was even going to be a divorce and that there was no real need 
for them to continue to attend the class on how to deal with the children in a divorce 
situation. He further told her that there was not going to be a separation. The result of 
respondent's statements was that Ms. Hood signed a Certificate of Completion allowing 
the parties to leave before the class was completed. 
12. Under the Decree of Divorce petitioner was awarded the custody of the minor 
children of the parties subject to respondent's rights of visitation. The petitioner was 
awarded the house and furnishings. Respondent was awarded his stock in DSI and the 
parties' investment in property in Kodiak, Alaska. It was further provided that respondent 
would be responsible for the payment of all debts up to June 1994. 
13. Respondent was to pay child support of $1,000 a month for the two minor 
children of the parties and alimony of $1,000 a month to the petitioner. He was further 
ordered to maintain health insurance for the children and life insurance on himself for the 
benefit of the children. The divorce was granted to the petitioner on her Complaint. 
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wl lich listeu uu. isiderable assets, including the balance sheet of March 31, 1994, 
produced as Exhibit No. 3 -meeting a DOCK value i ' ''I.K.lb.OU l| "it? 'LAHJI'I IIHIII i 
a number of factors and book value is only one of 
those factors. :• -T-^:--? Dbi is < rfu held corporation, and its primary assets were 
• •• • ' Jestminn its true value. I here is no 
auestinr •-:• *;.- 'esoondent's interes: --• :Jbi had some value and that respondent's 
interest in tne r\ " | 
$10,000 per month in income and, at that time, it was expected to produce tor a pe \ -\j 
the future. 
15. A I the time of the entry of the Decree of Divorce ir • - T ortgage 
payment on the home awarded to the petitioner was . - ..: - ^ >-JO 
nn in«(linn flu( ni iiiihiin MI support and alimony award to the petitioner. Fhis was at a time 
when petitioner had not worked outside of the home for a considerable period of time and 
wa ' ' '*"~ ! je. 
16. Prior to the divorce the standard ot living of the parties was one in which 
respondent would yiv» • In | i l l In. (in, I II , ]"ln < i-uniiK|t ni> iiil I i«rl 
existed for some si ibstantial period ct i ^.- .\|so at the t me >? *ne divorce responded vvas 
receiving a draw through his empu 
was fi jrther receiving a distribution on the Kodiak property of $10,000 a month, a combined 
amount ot $ 18,000 a month. 
17. Following the entry of the Decree of Divorce in July, 1994, there was no 
change in the relationship of the parties and in their living arrangements. The parties 
continued to live the same as they had prior to the divorce. Titles to marital residence was 
not transferred until after this action was filed. The title to the Kodiak property was never 
transferred. The parties continued to maintain a joint checking account. The parties filed 
a joint 1994 income tax return, reflecting that they were husband and wife as of the end of 
1994. The parties continued to cohabit with sexual relations. The children, who at that 
time were nine and three and one-half years of age, were never told about any changes 
in their parents' relationship. 
18. In July, 1994, the parties appeared at a counseling class and told the 
counselor that this divorce was only for business purposes and that the children would 
never know that the parties were divorced. The parties continued to socialize together; 
they attended a Christmas party together in December 1994, each held the other out as 
a married couple. No one in the community was told of the divorce at that time. During 
this time, respondent maintained an apartment in Texas. 
19. Respondent represented that he was concerned about his business dealings 
and the possibility of telephone surveillance, telling the petitioner that he could not talk with 
her on the phone. 
20. In May 1995, respondent sent petitioner an anniversary card in which he 
indicated he loved her and a wish for another 15 years. See Exhibit No. 6. 
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In the summer ( . as part of a family vacation, the parties ti aveled to 
Mexico, , si lared a i oon. a,.^ ,»ad sexual relations, 
22. In October 19PC respondent faxed a letter to petitioner expressing his love 
petitioner at Christmas so that things could again be the 
way they had been. See Exhibit No. 8. 
;n'i In III Il ill i ill II "I "I1" i | M lliliiii mi in Ilipraniit1 sir pn m in1! Iliiul fliine i r iiiiiii Illllii i 
Respondent told petitioner that his relationship with the other v/orrar as only a 
contin^ipn as it - *.* •• ^ p nasi durinq the,! . : y\ " iud'nc the,f :* <^a: relationshio 
Dm ii ig the entire period from llhe er . .. _ ^ 
relationship remained the same and respondent provided petitioner with L.VJS *: me same 
standard of living which had existed prior to the enti y of the Decree of Divorce. 
25 In the spnnq of 1996, petitioner found out that respondent's relationship with 
the other woman had not terminated In May 1996, there was an altercation which was 
'•sitation ilr.put* i^siillnni IIIIIII Illllii' pnlirp hoinq rallnl iiiiiiill llhi* 
filing of criminal chat - unst respondent Following this altercation, respondent cut 
in, 
i ier sought legal counse ^ seau^ntiv file "J actions including a Petition i Modify 
a I pleadings setting fortl I llnjuneb JI H f.nniin Hi I i - .mi iift j ami tii.iinl 
26. The Court finds that there was no fraud or misrepresentation in connection 
with the divorce in 1994 I Petitioner was college educated, and the Court: finds that her 
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claimed reliance on the representations of respondent was not justifiable. Given the 
circumstances at that time, however, neither party expected the property aspects of the 
divorce to be valid nor implemented. 
27. The Court finds that as of the entry of the Decree of Divorce on July 18, 
1994, petitioner knew that they would have to remarry. As of that day, the parties were 
unmarried. They continued their marital relationship, they continued to cohabit, they 
continued to treat each other as married, they had joint checking accounts, and respondent 
maintained all of his personal property at the marital residence. The parties filed joint 
income tax returns for the 1994 year. Respondent sent petitioner money from which she 
serviced joint debts. The parties maintained joint credit cards. The parties held 
themselves out as married in the area of their domicile in Davis County, and in that area 
of the domicile had the reputation of being married. They held themselves out to their 
children as married. The parties continued to cohabit and hold each other out as spouse 
through April of 1996. The parties had a reputation in the community for being married and 
all of these actions arise out of a contract between two consenting parties. 
28. The Court has heard much testimony regarding DSI's value. It is difficult to 
set the value of DSI. The Court finds that the critical day of valuation is the day of the 
Court's ruling. As of this time DSI is bereft of value except for receivables and a lien on 
the Bear Hollow house, which are of questionable value. In 1997 DSI did receive a 
substantial settlement in litigation in which it was involved in the amount of $1,900,000, 
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relief of debt and an agreement to hold DSI harmless. The net payment to DSI was 
$1,300,000 after the deduction of attorneys' fees and costs. 
29. The money from DSI's net settlement was used primarily for the purchase of 
a Mercedes 600SL and the construction of a large residence in Summit County, known as 
the Bear Hollow property. These expenditures were primarily for the benefit of respondent. 
The settlement funds were not used to retire DSI's substantial outstanding debt. 
30. With regard to the Kodiak property, its value is now negative, and the Court 
is unaware of its value, if any, now. 
31. Respondent has an interest in Omega Oil. From the testimony it is not clear 
whether this interest is a 10% interest in stock or an option to acquire 10% of the stock . 
Respondent is the president of Omega Oil and from Omega Oil receives a monthly income 
of $6,000 since June of 1996. Based upon the evidence before the Court, the Court is 
unable to set a value on respondent's interest in Omega Oil. 
32. Respondent is the title owner of property in Summit County known as the 
Bear Hollow property located at 2525 Bear Hollow Drive, Park City, Utah, which is more 
particularly described as: 
Lot 27, Block 5, Cedar Draw Estates, according to the 
official plat thereof, recorded in the official records of 
the Summit County Recorder. 
The value of this property is in question. There has been testimony of from $2,000,000 to 
$1,500,000. Against this property there is a primary trust deed obligation of $500,000 and 
a second trust deed obligation of $250,000. In addition, there is a $958,000 mechanic's 
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lien which has been filed by DSI and which currently is in litigation. The parties' equity 
interest in the Bear Hollow house, therefore, currently is in litigation in Summit County, 
Utah. 
33. The Court finds the home at 1995 South Maple Ridge Drive, Bountiful, Utah, 
has a value of $345,000, subject to a first mortgage obligation of $236,000 and an 
attorney's lien from Louise Knauer, petitioner's prior attorney, of $10,000, resulting in a 
remaining equity of $109,000. 
34. The Court finds that respondent has manipulated his corporations by taking 
funds through loans and not as income with these withdrawals as he sees fit. This is not 
a traditional method of compensation, and respondent has manipulated his income as he 
has seen fit. 
35. The Court finds that respondent has used the assets of these businesses to 
meet his own living expenses and to purchase property for his own interest. The Mercedes 
600SL is an example. 
36. The Court finds that historically respondent has had an income in excess of 
$10,000 a month with funds received from the Kodiak property and a salary of $8,000 from 
DSI. Currently respondent receives a salary of $6,000 a month from Omega Oil. In 
addition, respondent has received funds through loans not reflected as income from his 
various businesses. Consistent with his past manipulations, respondent currently has 
manipulated his income to limit his income presented in this proceeding. 
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37. The Court finds that the income amounts reflected above coincide with the 
amount of funds utilized by the parties to meet ongoing family expenses, both prior to the 
entry of the Decree of Divorce in July, 1994, and since that time. 
38. The Court finds that respondent currently has the ability to produce income 
at the amount of $10,0(30 a month and finds that his income is in this amount. 
39. Petitioner has sought and obtained employment and currently has the ability 
to earn an income on an hourly rate of $8.71 per hour in the gross amount of $1,498 a 
month on a full-time basis. This amount would be subject to taxes. She is capable of 
working full time, but is working on a part-time basis by choice. 
40. The gross income of the parties exceeds the child support guideline. 
41. The Court finds that each of the parties have incurred attorneys' fees in this 
action. The Court further finds that there has been certain obstreperous conduct on the 
part of respondent with respect to discovery, making it difficult to process and prosecute 
this action. The Court further finds that respondent has a substantial ability to earn an 
income. 
42. As to the fees incurred by petitioner while represented by Louise Knauer, the 
Court heard testimony from Louise Knauer and finds that those fees were necessarily 
incurred. The work performed was reasonable and necessary for the prosecution of this 
action. The Court further finds that petitioner has no funds with which to pay these fees. 
The attorney's fees petitioner incurred for the services of Louise Knauer in the amount of 
$10,951 were reasonably and necessarily incurred. 
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43. As to the fees incurred by petitioner while represented by B. L. Dart and Mark 
A. Larsen, the Court finds that substantial work was performed, that a large amount of this 
work was necessary to prosecute this case to a conclusion through trial. The Court further 
finds that petitioner has no funds with which to pay these fees. The request for attorney's 
fees of Dart and Larsen is the amount of $46,574.95, as reflected in Exhibit Nos. 15 & 16. 
The Court finds that this is excessive, that these are two well-qualified lawyers, either of 
whom could have individually tried the case without the need of the other. Under all the 
facts and circumstances of this case the Court finds that the reasonable amount for the 
attorneys' fees incurred by these attorneys for their reasonable and necessary services is 
the sum of $25,000 forwhich respondent should be responsible to petitioner. 
Based upon the preceding findings of fact, the Court enters the following 
conclusions of law: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. Petitioner has failed to show fraud by clear and convincing evidence. 
2. There was a common law marriage entered into by the parties by reason of 
their ongoing relationship. This common law marriage commenced immediately following 
the entry of the Decree of Divorce on the 18th day of July, 1994, and will terminate at such 
time as the Decree of Divorce enters in this case. 
3. The parties have now been separated since June 1996, the differences 
between them are irreconcilable and petitioner is entitled to a divorce from respondent on 
the grounds of irreconcilable differences. 
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4. In June of 1996, respondent elected to terminate the parties ongoing 
relationship and his financial support of petitioner. These actions constituted a substantial 
change of circumstances. 
5. Based upon the change of circumstances which the Court has found and, 
further, based upon the common law marriage of the parties, the Court hereby modifies the 
terms of the former settlement to provide for the following award: 
a. Petitioner is awarded the equity of the parties in the home and real property 
at 1995 South Maple Ridge Drive, Bountiful, Utah, subject to petitioner 
assuming its outstanding indebtedness. 
b. Petitioner is awarded all furniture and fixtures located therein. 
c. Petitioner is awarded one-third of respondent's equity in the Bear Hollow 
property, and respondent is awarded two-thirds of his equity in the Bear 
Hollow property, subject to outstanding liens against it. The property is more 
particularly described as: 
Lot 27, Block 5, Cedar Draw Estates, according to the 
official plat thereof, recorded in the official records of 
the Summit County Recorder. 
Respondent is ordered to pay all taxes, utilities, debt and Trust Deed Notes 
on the Bear Hollow house. The parties at their mutual expense are to retain 
an independent appraiser to establish an appraisal value for the Bear Hollow 
property. The property is currently listed for sale and should continue to be 
listed for sale over a multiple board listing under terms that the property is to 
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be sold for any cash offer for 90% or more of the appraised value. Each 
party shall be apprised of any offers and have the right of open 
communication with the listing realtor. If any other offers are received which 
one party desires to accept and the other party does not desire to accept, 
then the party desiring to accept the offer shall have the right to come before 
the Court to request that the property be sold for this offer and the Court will 
then make a determination of whether this sale is to occur on these terms, 
d. Respondent is awarded his interest in the property in Kodiak, Alaska, subject 
to any outstanding obligations owing thereon. This property is more particularly described 
as follows: 
That portion of Lot two (2), Block ten (10), New Kodiak 
Subdivision, according to Plat 72-2, located in this 
Kodiak Recording District, Third Judicial District, State 
of Alaska, which lies within the following described 
property: 
That portion of United States Survey Number 559, 
located in the Kodiak Recording District, Third 
Judicial District, State of Alaska, more particularly 
described as follows: 
Beginning at Corner No. 1 of United States Survey 
Number 1797, as shown on the Plat of Kodiak 
Townsite, United States Survey Number 2537B, as 
accepted by the Commissioner of the General Land 
Office, September 11, 1941, said point being an 
unnumbered corner of United States Survey Number 
559, the TRUE POINT OF BEGINNING of this 
description; 
Thence N 44 degrees 22' W, a distance of 56.58 feet; 
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Thence N 45 degrees 50' E, a distance of 138.09 feet; 
Thence S 44 degrees 10' E, a distance of 131.38 feet; 
Thence S 45 degrees 50' W, a distance of 138.00 feet, 
more or less, to a point of intersection with a line drawn 
S 44 degrees 22' W, a distance of 78.06 feet, more or 
less, to the TRUE POINT OF BEGINNING. 
e. Respondent is awarded his stock or option interests in Omega Oil. 
f. Respondent is awarded any property currently in his possession, including 
furniture and furnishings and any interest, if any, in the Mercedes 600SL. 
g. Respondent is awarded certain personal property and to the extent it is in the 
possession of petitioner and with reference to Exhibit P34, these items are 
as follows: 
(1) The floor standing globe. 
(2) The Baldwin piano with delivery to occur after the last child 
reaches majority or has moved from the home, whichever occurs first. 
Petitioner shall have the responsibility of maintaining the piano and 
having it tuned annually. 
(3). One-half of the power and hand tools. The tools are to be divided 
under an arrangement that petitioner is to make a List "A" and a List 
"B", dividing the tools. Respondent will then have the choice of which 
list of tools he desires and will be awarded those tools. Petitioner will 
be awarded the rest. 
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6. With regard to the indebtedness of the parties, petitioner should assume and 
pay the first mortgage obligation on the house and real property at 1995 South Maple 
Ridge Drive, Bountiful, Utah. Respondent is ordered to assume and pay all other liabilities 
and debt incurred during this marriage, including but not limited to any liabilities in 
connection with DSI, the Bear Hollow property and Omega Oil. 
7. The Court finds that petitioner is entitled to be and is awarded the custody 
of the minor children of the parties, subject to respondent's reasonable rights of visitation, 
which right of visitation shall be, at a minimum, consistent with the schedule provided under 
the Minimum Visitation Guidelines set forth in Title 30-3-35, Utah Code Annotated. The 
respondent shall have the right to visit with the children irrespective of the payment of child 
support. During visitation, there shall be no phone calls to the children unless there is an 
emergency. Visitation should be specifically scheduled on a monthly basis one month in 
advance and if respondent is scheduled to have the children for a visitation, he must give 
the petitioner at least 24 hours' notice of his intent not to exercise the scheduled visitation. 
Respondent should have such other extended visitation as agreeable 
to the parties mutually. 
8. The Court finds that respondent's obligation to petitioner for child support, 
taking into consideration the amount of alimony awarded, shall be the sum of $2,000 a 
month and this award of child support shall commence with the month of December, 1998. 
So long as respondent is current on his obligation for child support, he can claim one of the 
children as a deduction'for income tax purposes, which right to declare one of the children 
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as a deduction for income tax purposes shall not arise until he has used his net loss carry 
forward as reflected on his income tax returns. 
9. As a further obligation of child support, respondent shall pay health and 
accident insurance for the benefit of the minor children and shall be responsible for two-
thirds of any uninsured medical, dental, orthodontia and counseling expenses for the minor 
children of the parties. 
10. Based upon the financial circumstances of the parties the Court finds that 
petitioner's reasonable monthly expenses, exclusive of liability for income taxes is the sum 
of $5,000 a month. Respondent has detailed expenses of $10,500 a month, a substantial 
portion of which relates to the Bear Hollow home, which is currently listed for sale and 
which it is anticipated will be sold in the near future. 
11. Based upon the current financial circumstances of the parties the Court finds 
that respondent shall pay to petitioner alimony in the sum of $3,000 a month and petitioner 
is awarded alimony in this amount commencing with the month of December, 1998. 
Petitioner's entitlement to alimony, based upon the marriage of the parties from 1980 to 
1996, should be for the period of 16 years or until such time as petitioner remarries, 
cohabits or the death of either party. Alimony under this judgment should commence with 
the month of December, 1998. 
12. The Court further finds that the alimony and child support in the combined 
amount of $5,000 is an amount which petitioner should receive from respondent retroactive 
to the date of the first Order entered by Commissioner Dillon in this action. Respondent 
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shall receive credit for any payments which he has made against this obligation, which 
payments will be applied pro rata to child support and alimony with 2/5 to be applied to 
child support and 3/5 to be applied to alimony. The Court finds that from the entry of the 
Temporary Order through the month of February, 1999, based on this calculation and 
reflecting credits for payments, there are arrearages which shall be reduced to judgment 
in the amount of $93,586.00. These arrearages do not give credit to respondent for a 
claimed payment on the first mortgage on petitioner's home in December, 1996, in the 
amount of $6,902.25. If respondent can document this payment, then it would constitute 
a reduction against the above balance. 
The Court finds that the arrearages reflected above are for alimony 
and child support with $37,434.40 as arrearages in child support and $56,151.60 as 
arrearages in alimony. 
13. As to the fees incurred by petitioner while represented by Louise Knauer, the 
Court awards attorneys' fees to petitioner in the form of a judgment for the services of 
Louise Knauer in the amount of $10,951. 
14. As to the fees incurred by petitioner while represented by B. L. Dart and Mark 
A. Larsen, the Court awards petitioner a judgment for the amount of $25,000 attorneys' 
fees. 
15. The award of attorneys' fees shall be reduced to judgment with the judgment 
for the past-due support. 
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16. Petitioner is further awarded her costs incurred in this action in the sum of 
$2,890.76 as reflected on Exhibit Nos. 15 & 16. 
17. The judgments entered in this action for arrearages of child support and 
alimony and for attorneys' fees should be filed in the State of Alaska to attach respondent's 
interest in the Kodiak property and in Summit County, Utah, to attach respondent's interest 
in the Bear Hollow property. 
Dated this ^ f l ^ d a v of *LJIJ 1999. 
BY THE COURT: 
Rodney ^ p a g e , District Court Judge 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
&^_fo~t*—-
ELLEN M A Y ( 2 O £ K 
Attorney for Respondent 
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I hereby certify that on the _/ day of July, 1999,1 mailed a copy of the foregoing 
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Ellen Maycock 
Attorney for Respondent 
50 West Broadway, Suite 800 
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David Benard, Esq. 
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DARTADAMSON DONOVAN & HANSON 
310 South Main Street, Suite 1330 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (801)521-6383 
MARK A. LARSEN (3727) 
LARSEN & MOONEY LAW 
50 West Broadway, Suite 100 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-2006 
Telephone: (801) 364-6500 
Attorneys for Petitioner 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
—000OOO000— 
SONIAKELLEY, 
Petitioner, DECREE OF DIVORCE 
WAYNE KELLEY, Civil No. 944700827DA 
Respondent. Judge Rodney S. Page 
—000OOQ000— 
The above-entitled consolidated matters came on regularly for trial on the 3rd and 
4th days of December, 1998, petitioner appearing in person and by her attorneys, B. L. Dart 
and Mark A. Larsen, respondent appearing in person and by his attorney, Ellen Maycock 
and the Court having heard testimony from witnesses and having received various 
documentary evidence and the matter having been argued and submitted and the Court 
having made and entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, now, therefore, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED: 
1. Petitioner claim of fraud is dismissed. 
2. The parties are married common law. 
3. Petitioner is awarded a divorce from respondent on the grounds of 
irreconcilable differences, which Decree shall become final upon signing and entry. 
4. In June of 1996, respondent elected to terminate the parties ongoing 
relationship and his financial support of petitioner. These actions constituted a substantial 
change of circumstances. 
5. Based upon the change of circumstances which the Court has found and, 
further, based upon the common law marriage of the parties, the Court hereby modifies the 
terms of the former settlement to provide for the following award of property. 
a. Petitioner is awarded the equity of the parties in the home and real 
property at 1995 South Maple Ridge Drive, Bountiful, Utah, subject to 
petitioner assuming its outstanding indebtedness. 
b. Petitioner is awarded all furniture and fixtures located therein. 
c. Petitioner is awarded one-third of respondent's equity in the Bear 
Hollow property and respondent is awarded two-thirds of his equity 
in the Bear Hollow property, subject to outstanding liens against it. 
The property is more particularly described as: 
Lot 27, Block 5, Cedar Draw Estates, according to 
the official plat thereof, recorded in the official 
records of the Summit County Recorder. 
The value of this property is in question. Respondent is ordered to pay 
all taxes, utilities, debt and Trust Deed Notes on the Bear Hollow 
house. The parties at their mutual expense are to retain an 
independent appraiser to establish an appraisal value for the Bear 
Hollow property. The property is currently listed for sale and should 
continue to be listed for sale over a multiple board listing under terms 
that the property is to be sold for any cash offer for 90% or more of 
the appraised value. Each party shall be apprised of any offers and 
have the right of open communication with the listing realtor. If any 
other offers are received which one party desires to accept and the 
other party does not desire to accept, then the party desiring to accept 
the offer shall have the right to come before the Court to request that 
the property be sold for this offer and the Court will then make a 
determination of whether this sale is to occur on these terms. 
d. Respondent is awarded his interest in the property in Kodiak, Alaska, 
subject to any outstanding obligations owing thereon. This property 
is more particularly described as follows: 
That portion of Lot two (2), Block ten (10), New Kodiak 
Subdivision, according to Plat 72-2, located in this 
Kodiak Recording District, Third Judicial District, State 
of Alaska, which lies within the following described 
property: 
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That portion of United States Survey Number 559, 
located in the Kodiak Recording District, Third 
Judicial District, State of Alaska, more particularly 
described as follows: 
Beginning at Corner No. 1 of United States Survey 
Number 1797, as shown on the Plat of Kodiak 
Townsite, United States Survey Number 2537B, as 
accepted by the Commissioner of the General Land 
Office, September 11, 1941, said point being an 
unnumbered corner of United States Survey Number 
559, the TRUE POINT OF BEGINNING of this 
description; 
Thence N 44 degrees 22' W, a distance of 56.58 feet; 
Thence N 45 degrees 50' E, a distance of 138.09 feet; 
Thence S 44 degrees 10' E, a distance of 131.38 feet; 
Thence S 45 degrees 50' W, a distance of 138.00 feet, 
more or less, to a point of intersection with a line drawn 
S 44 degrees 22' W, a distance of 78.06 feet, more or 
less, to the TRUE POINT OF BEGINNING. 
e. Respondent is awarded his stock or option interests in Omega Oil. 
f. Respondent is awarded any property currently in his possession, 
including furniture and furnishings and any interest, if any, in the 
Mercedes 600SL. 
g. Respondent is awarded certain personal property and to the extent it 
is in the possession of petitioner and with reference to Exhibit P34, 
these items are as follows: 
(1) The floor standing globe. 
(2) The Baldwin piano with delivery to occur after the last child 
reaches majority or has moved from the home, whichever 
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occurs first. Petitioner shall have the responsibility of 
maintaining the piano and having it tuned annually. 
(3) One-half of the power and hand tools. The tools are to be 
divided under an arrangement that petitioner is to make a List 
"A" and a List "B", dividing the tools. Respondent will then 
have the choice of which list of tools he desires and will be 
awarded those tools. Petitioner will be awarded the rest. 
6. With regard to the indebtedness of the parties, petitioner is ordered to 
assume and pay the first mortgage obligation on the house and real property at 1995 
South Maple Ridge Drive, Bountiful, Utah. Respondent is ordered to assume and pay all 
other liabilities and debt incurred during this marriage, including but not limited to any 
liabilities in connection with DSI, the Bear Hollow property and Omega Oil. 
7. Petitioner is entitled to be and is awarded the custody of the minor children 
of the parties, subject to respondent's reasonable rights of visitation, which right of 
visitation shall be, at a minimum, consistent with the schedule provided under the Minimum 
Visitation Guidelines set forth in Title 30-3-35, Utah Code Annotated. The respondent shall 
have the right to visit with the children irrespective of the payment of child support. 
During visitation, there shall be no phone calls to the children unless there is an 
emergency. Visitation shall be specifically scheduled on a monthly basis one month in 
advance and if respondent is scheduled to have the children for a visitation, he must give 
the petitioner at least 24 hours notice of his intent not to exercise the scheduled visitation. 
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Respondent shall have such other extended visitation as agreeable to the 
parties mutually. 
8. Respondent's obligation to petitioner for child support, taking into 
consideration the amount of alimony awarded, shall be the sum of $2,000 a month and this 
award of child support shall commence with the month of December, 1998. So long as 
respondent is current on his obligation for child support, he can claim one of the children 
as a deduction for income tax purposes, which right to declare one of the children as a 
deduction for income tax purposes shall not arise until he has used his net loss carry 
forward as reflected on his income tax returns. 
9. As a further obligation of child support, respondent shall pay health and 
accident insurance for the benefit of the minor children and shall be responsible for two-
thirds of any uninsured medical, dental, orthodontia and counseling expenses for the minor 
children of the parties. 
10. Respondent is ordered to pay to petitioner alimony in the sum of $3,000 a 
month and petitioner is awarded alimony in this amount commencing with the month of 
December, 1998. Petitioner's entitlement to alimony, based upon the marriage of the 
parties from 1980 to 1996, shall be for the period of 16 years or until such time as 
petitioner remarries, cohabits or the death of either party. Alimony under this judgment 
shall commence with the month of December, 1998. 
11. The alimony and child support in the combined amount of $5,000 is an 
amount which petitioner shall receive from respondent retroactive to the date of the first 
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Order entered by Commissioner Dillon in this action. Respondent shall receive credit for 
any payments which he has made against this obligation, which payments shall be applied 
pro rata to child support and alimony with 2/5 to be applied to child support and 3/5 to be 
applied to alimony. From the entry of the Temporary Order through the month of February, 
1999, based on this calculation and reflecting credits for payments, there are arrearages 
which shall be reduced to judgment in the amount of $93,586. These arrearages do not 
give credit to respondent for a claimed payment on the first mortgage on petitioner's home 
in December, 1996, in the amount of $6,902.25. If respondent can document this payment 
then it would constitute a reduction against the above balance. 
The arrearages reflected above are for alimony and child support with 
$37,434.40 as arrearages in child support and $56,151.60 as arrearages in alimony. 
12. Petitioner is awarded attorneys' fees in the form of a judgment for the 
services of Louise Knauer in the amount of $10,951. 
13. Petitioner is awarded attorney fees in the form of a judgment for the services 
of B. L. Dart and Mark A. Larsen, in the amount of $25,000 attorneys' fees. 
14. The award of attorneys' fees shaH be reduced to judgment with the judgment 
for the past-due support. 
15. Petitioner is awarded her costs incurred in this action in the sum of 
$2,890.76. 
16. The judgments entered in this action for arrearages of child support and 
alimony and for attorneys' fees shall be filed in the State of Alaska to attach respondent's 
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interest in the Kodiak property and in Summit County, Utah, to attach respondent's interest 
in the Bear Hollow property. 
Dated this z o ^ d a y of ^ k J L u 1999. 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
BY THE COURT: 
AM 
Rodney S. flage, District Court Judge 
ELLEN MAYqgCK 
Attorney for Respondent 
to: 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
hereby certify that on the J__ day of July, 1999,1 mailed a copy of the foregoing 
Ellen Maycock 
Attorney for Respondent 
50 West Broadway, #800 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
David Benard, Esq. 
523 Heritage Blvd., #1 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
—000OOO000— 
SONIA KELLEY, 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
Petitioner, : RE: CONTEMPT 
v. 
WAYNE KELLEY, : Civil No. 944700827DA 
Respondent. : Judge Rodney S. Page 
—000OOO000— 
Petitioner's Motion for Contempt came on regularly for hearing on Friday, the 
25th day of June, 1999, at the hour of 10:00 a.m., petitioner appearing in person and by her 
attorney, B. L. Dart and respondent appearing by telephone and by his attorney, Ellen Maycock 
and the Court having heard testimony from both of the parties, having heard arguments of 
counsel and having reviewed the file in this case and being fully advised, hereby finds as follows 
by clear and convincing evidence: 
1. The Court finds that respondent was aware of the Court's Order relative to 
child support and alimony. 
2. The Court finds that respondent has failed to pay any alimony since the 
divorce was granted and the Order was entered, which was to begin in December, 1998. 
3. The Court further finds that at the trial the Court found that respondent had 
the ability to earn at least $10,000 a month from various sources. 
4. The Court finds that historically respondent has lived far beyond that kind 
of income. Therefore, the Court finds that the $10,000 a month is a minimum and that he has the 
ability to make that kind of income if he chooses to so direct his activities. The Court finds that 
respondent has voluntarily chosen to stay with Omega Oil in which he has an interest and thereby 
reduce his income from the possibility of greater income. The Court finds respondent has done 
that to the detriment of the petitioner in this action and the children in the sense that he has failed 
to pay debts and obligations which he was ordered to pay under the Decree of Divorce, namely 
the sums owing to Seattle First National Bank d/b/a SeaFirst Bank and Citibank, and as a result 
they have now brought actions against the petitioner. 
5. The Court finds that respondent has the ability to generate sufficient 
income to meet these obligations which he was ordered to pay under the ruling made by the 
Court in December, 1998, but has failed and refused to do so. 
6. Respondent continues to live a lifestyle which allows him to take the 
children to Africa, even though he claims he would have someone else pay the costs. This is 
typical of the kinds of things he has done in the past. 
7. The Court finds that based upon clear and convincing evidence respondent 
is in contempt of the Order of this Court by reason of his failure to pay the debts and obligations 
as ordered by the Court and for his failure to pay child support and alimony as ordered by the 
Court. 
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8. The Court sentences respondent to 30 days in the Davis County Jail and a 
fine of $299 with the sentence to be stayed if respondent forthwith brings current the obligations 
to Citibank and SeaFirst Bank or takes care of the lawsuits that have been filed against petitioner 
and relieves the pressure on petitioner and, further, that he forthwith begin to make the full 
$5,000 per month for child support and alimony. Those payments should begin in the month of 
June, 1999 and continue to be kept current in future months. 
Forthwith means performance by the 31st day of July, 1999. 
9. Petitioner is awarded reasonable attorney's fees for her attorney to be 
established by Affidavit from petitioner's attorney with respondent to have five days to file a 
response. 
DATED this 3tf^ day of S l L 1999. 
BY THE COURT: 
RODNEY S J P A G E r 
District Court Judge 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
ELLEN MAY^pCK 
Attorney for Respondent 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on July 22, 1999,1 caused to be delivered to the following individual 
(s) the foregoing document via U.S. Mail: 
Ellen Maycock 
Attorney for Respondent 
50 West Broadway, #800 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
David Benard, Esq. 
523 Heritage Blvd., #1 
Layton, UT 84041 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
—oooOOOooo— 
SONIAKELLEY, : 
Petitioner, : ORDER FOR CONTEMPT AND 
RULING ON PENDING MOTIONS 
v. : 
WAYNE KELLEY, : Civil No. 944700827DA 
Respondent. : Judge Rodney S. Page 
—oooOOOooo— 
Petitioner's request that respondent be found in contempt of court and 
respondent's Motion for credit for payment of debts against alimony and support obligations, 
came on regularly for hearing on Friday, the 25th day of June, 1999, petitioner appearing in 
person and by her attorney, B.L. Dart and respondent appearing by telephone connection 
pursuant to his request and by his attorney, Ellen Maycock and the Court having taken testimony 
and heard the arguments of counsel and read the various motions and supporting documentation 
and having reviewed the prior orders in this case and having made and entered its Findings of 
Fact hereby orders as follows: 
1. Based upon the Findings of Fact the Court finds respondent in contempt of 
court for his failure to pay the debts and obligations as ordered by the Court and for his failure to 
pay his child support and alimony obligations in a timely manner as ordered by the Court and 
hereby sentences respondent to serve 30 days in the Davis County Jail and to pay a fine in the 
sum of $299. Respondent can stay the imposition of this sentence by performing the following 
acts: 
a. Forthwith brings current the obligation to Seattle First National 
Bank d/b/a SeaFirst Bank, filed in the Third District Court for Summit County, Civil No. 
990600164 or takes care of this lawsuit and relieves the pressure on petitioner. 
b. Forthwith brings current the obligation to Citibank in the District 
Court of Davis County, Civil No. 990800256 or takes care of this lawsuit and relieves the 
pressure on petitioner. 
c. Forthwith paying to petitioner the remaining unpaid portion of 
child support and alimony for the month of June, 1999, of $3,000. 
d. Payment of each future month's child support and alimony on a 
timely basis. 
Forthwith means performance by the 31st day of July, 1999. 
2. During the pendency of this action respondent paid payments of $3,518.10 
to Seattle First National Bank and $3,222.48 to USAA Federal Savings Bank. Respondent has 
requested that these payments be treated as credits against his obligation for child support and 
alimony arrearages. The Court has reviewed respondent's Affidavit and petitioner's Response 
Affidavit and Reply. The Court has also checked the previous Orders of this Court. The record 
reflects that these obligations were the obligations of respondent. The record further reflects that 
these payments were made from the sale of a marital asset. The Court denies respondent's 
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request that these be applied as a credit against respondent's alimony and child support 
arrearages. 
3. During argument respondent's counsel moved the Court for an Order that 
all payments previously made by respondent against the Court's order for child support jnd 
alimony be applied solely to child support. This Motion is denied. The Court orders that all 
payments heretofore made on prior Orders and to be made on future Orders are to be applied pro 
rata to alimony and child support. Based on the current Order of I he ( ourt at $5,000 a month 
consisting of alimony in the sum of $3,000 and child support in the sum of $2,000. Payments 
shall be applied 3/5 to alimony and 2/5 to child support. 
4. Petitioner is awarded her reasonable attorney's fees for the Motion for 
Contempt and appearance on other Motions and is directed to provide an Affidavit from her 
attorney reflecting these fees. Respondent will have five days to respond to this Affidavit. 
DATED this 3 0 ^ day of J j L 1999. 
BY THE COURT: 
(AJA A A I / 
RODNEY &JPAGE 
District Court Judge 
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